

# The Bankruptcy Landscape Today

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May 2021

# Outline

- Liability structure of consumer bankruptcies: how large are tax liabilities?
- How has COVID-19 recession affected bankruptcy rates?
- Intersection of tax incentives and restructuring moving forward

# Structure of Liabilities

# Consumer liabilities

## Average Ch. 7

- Secured: 39.8%
- Unsecured Priority: 1.6%
- Unsecured: 58.6%

## Median (Average) Debt Amounts

- Secured: \$26,762 (\$127K)
- Unsecured Priority: \$0 (\$4k)
- Unsecured: \$47,019 (\$116k)

## Average Ch. 13


- Secured: 62.3%
- Unsecured Priority: 2.5%
- Unsecured: 35.1%

## Median (Average) Debt Amounts

- Secured: \$152K (\$192K)
- Unsecured Priority: \$0 (\$4k)
- Unsecured: \$38K (\$60K)

# Bankruptcy Trends During COVID-19 Recession

# Bankruptcies Are Counter-Cyclical, Correlated With Unemployment





Correlation: 0.54

Especially strong correlation in GFC

# Bankruptcies Dropped Significantly Starting In Mid-March

Consumer (-31% YOY)

Business (-17% YOY)



Regression coefficients with seasonal controls based on 2019

## Key Dates

- 1/20 – First COVID case
- 3/13 – National Emergency
- 3/16 – 3/23: Court Shutdowns
- 3/27 – CARES Act Signed
- 4/15 – Stimulus Payments
- 4/3 & 27 – PPP
- 7/24-26 – Eviction moratoria, enhanced UI expired


# Higher Unemployment → Greater DECLINE in Bankruptcies

X-axis:  
Percentage point  
 $\Delta$  unemployment  
rate

Y-axis:  
YOY % change in  
bankruptcies


### Consumer

Ch7




### Business


Ch7



Ch13



Ch11




# Why are bankruptcies down?

- In 2020: “missing” 232,000 household bankruptcies compared to 2019.
  - Probably “missing” a lot more than that because 2020 was much harder year economically
- Why?
  - **Lender forbearance**
  - Gov’t support (stimulus checks and PPP loans?)
  - Uncertainty


# Creditor Leniency

Mortgage delinquency  $\uparrow$ , foreclosure  $\downarrow$




Source: Black Knight/McDash

Delinquency  $\uparrow$  in high unemployment states



Foreclosure  $\downarrow$  in high unemployment states



# Major Takeaways

- There is likely a lot of financial distress that still needs to be dealt with
  - At least 230,000 households that would have filed for bankruptcy absent a pandemic
  - And the economy is probably at least somewhat different going forward, so some extra restructuring is likely needed
- Bankruptcy is one way to do this, but not the only way
- Big question: what happens when moratoria and leniency end???

# Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Restructuring

# Greenwood & Thesmar Proposal

- Government subsidizing renegotiation with tax incentives
- Suppose you have renter who owes landlord \$10,000
- Voluntary agreement signed by both landlord and renter
  - Landlord gives up claim to unpaid rent: \$10,000 of debt relief
  - Renter does not have to move
  - Landlord receives a tax credit for a fraction of the forgiven rent (say, \$2,000)
- Shares costs of restructuring between taxpayers and landlords
- Avoids: extra bankruptcies, unnecessary evictions, etc.

# Conclusion

- Bankruptcies fell dramatically in 2020, counter to historical trends
- Evidence on channels:
  1. Creditor Leniency: Ch. 13 filings down, homeowner filings down
  2. Liquidity constraints: pro se filings down, rebound in filings corresponds to stimulus
  3. Uncertainty: likely important
  4. Physical constraints: not likely a large factor
- Most debtors won't file until forced to do so by creditors
  - Large firms are exception: view bankruptcy as strategic option