Is Broader Always Better? Preexisting Distortions, Emissions Elasticities, and the Scope of Emissions Pricing

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(Preliminary version – please check with authors before quoting specific results)

How Broad Should Emissions Pricing Be?

- Economists typically advocate for economy-wide carbon price
 - This equalizes incentive across all emissions sources, which minimizes abatement costs (in a model with no other distortions)
- But there are often political or distributional advantages to narrower carbon prices (exempting some sectors)
 - Sen. Wyden in 2021: carbon tax that would exempt gasoline
 - Some consideration of an electric-power-sector-only carbon tax
 - Other countries' carbon prices often exempt some sectors



Key Questions

- Is broader emissions pricing always more cost-effective than narrow?
- How big are the cost differences?
- What factors determine the size (and direction?) of the cost differences
- How do the answers change as the policy becomes more stringent (i.e., for larger reductions in emissions)?



This Paper

- Compares broad vs. narrow carbon pricing in models with pre-existing tax distortions
- Uses a relatively simple analytical model to develop intuition and identify key effects
- Uses the Goulder-Hafstead E3 model (multi-sector dynamic CGE) to model effects in US economy and evaluate magnitudes



Preview of Results

- Narrow carbon tax <u>can</u> be more cost-effective than broad
 - Depends on characteristics of the sector excluded from the tax
- Why? Interactions with pre-existing distortions from broader tax system
- And even if narrow tax is less cost-effective, difference can be small
- But for sufficiently large reductions in emissions, broader tax is always more cost-effective
 - And cost advantage of broader tax rises as policy gets more stringent



What Determines Cost Effect of Excluding a Sector?

- Revenue-recycling effect: efficiency gain from recycling carbon tax revenue to cut other taxes
- Tax-interaction effect: efficiency loss because carbon tax exacerbates preexisting tax distortions
- Emissions elasticity: how responsive emissions are to the tax rate
 - For a given overall reduction in emissions:
 - Excluding a low-elasticity sector increases direct costs (costs ignoring TI and RR effects) by less
 - Excluding a low-elasticity sector reduces revenue (relevant because both TI and RR effects are roughly proportional to revenue)
- Elasticity and TI effect vary by sector. RR effect depends how tax revenue is used.



Intuition for Results

- Direct cost is always higher for narrower tax.
 - But cost increase is smaller when excluding less elastic sectors
- If TI effect is larger than RR effect, then net TI/RR increases cost
 - That cost increase (per ton) is larger for less elastic sectors (less elastic -> more revenue for given emissions reduction)
 - Reversed if RR larger than TI (lowers cost, larger drop if less elastic)
- TI/RR effects roughly proportional to tax rate. Direct cost roughly proportional to square of tax rate
 - Intercept of cost curve determined by TI/RR effects
 - Slope determined largely by direct cost
 - Implication: narrower can be better for small emissions reductions, but broader is better for sufficiently large reduction




Policies Modeled

- Economy-wide carbon tax
- Carbon tax only on the electric power sector
- Carbon tax with exemption for household use of motor vehicle fuel
 - Approximates an exemption for gasoline
- Carbon tax with exemption for energy-intensive trade-exposed sectors
- Inverses of these policies (e.g., exempt power sector, tax only motor fuel)
 - Not politically relevant, but useful as illustration
- Different uses for carbon tax revenue
 - Lump-sum rebates to households
 - Cuts to individual income tax rates



Abatement Costs with Lump-Sum Recycling






Decomposing Intercepts (Lump-Sum Recycling)

					Marginal Cost Per Ton Reduced (at Intercept)					
	Net tax-interaction/ revenue-recycling effect per dollar of tax revenue		Leakage- Adjusted Semi-							
Coverage	i		Elasticity	Ana	lytical Model	Num	nerical Model	Difference		
Economy-Wide	\$	0.26	1.1%	\$	23.76	\$	23.74	0.1%		
Power Sector Only	\$	0.31	2.6%	\$	11.89	\$	11.88	0.1%		
Power Sector Exempt	\$	0.23	0.4%	\$	60.28	\$	60.27	0.0%		
Motor Vehicle Fuel Exemption	\$	0.28	1.3%	\$	22.22	\$	22.20	0.1%		
Motor Vehicle Fuel Only	\$	0.13	0.1%	\$	105.30	\$	105.29	0.0%		
EITE Industry Exemption	\$	0.25	1.1%	\$	22.84	\$	22.82	0.1%		
EITE Industry Only	\$	0.36	0.8%		44.98	\$	44.96	0.0%		

Abatement Costs with Indiv. Income Tax Recycling



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Decomposing Intercepts (Indiv. Income Tax Recycling)

				Marginal Cost Per Ton Reduced (at Intercept)					
	reve	tax-interaction/ nue-recycling effect per ar of tax revenue	Leakage- Adjusted Semi-						
Coverage			Elasticity	Ana	alytical Model	Num	nerical Model	Difference	
Economy-Wide	\$	0.08	1.1%	\$	7.17	\$	7.17	0.1%	
Power Sector Only	\$	0.13	2.6%	\$	5.08	\$	5.07	0.1%	
Power Sector Exempt	\$	0.05	0.4%	\$	13.58	\$	13.58	0.0%	
Motor Vehicle Fuel Exemption	\$	0.12	1.3%	\$	9.32	\$	9.31	0.1%	
Motor Vehicle Fuel Only	\$	-0.12	0.1%	\$	-97.48	\$	-97.48	0.0%	
EITE Industry									
Exemption	\$	0.07	1.1%	\$	6.48	\$	6.47	0.1%	
EITE Industry Only	\$	0.18	0.8%	\$	22.93	\$	22.92	0.0%	

Conclusions/Implications

- Narrow carbon tax <u>can</u> be more cost-effective than broad
 - Depends on emissions elasticities and tax interactions
- Even when broader tax is more cost-effective, cost difference can be small
- But for sufficiently large reductions in emissions, broader tax is always more cost-effective (and difference grows as policy gets more stringent)
- Narrow tax could be attractive for political or distributional reasons, and could have a cost advantage (or only small disadvantage)
- If policy is going to tighten over time, could make sense to start with narrow tax and broaden over time
- Results should generalize to other policies and other distortions

