Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of Restricted-Spending Philanthropy

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Abstract

American foundations and other philanthropic giving entities hold about $1 trillion in investment assets, and that figure continues to grow every year. Even as urgent contemporary needs go unmet, philanthropic organizations spend only a tiny fraction of their wealth each year, mostly due to restrictive terms in contracts between donors and firms limiting the rate at which donations can be distributed. Law has played a critical role in underwriting and encouraging this build-up of philanthropic wealth. For instance, contributors can typically take a full tax deduction for the value of their contribution today, no matter when the foundation spends their money, and pay no tax on the investment earnings the organization reaps in the meantime.

What, if anything, justifies public support for “restricted spending” charity? This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of that question, and supplies original empirical evidence on several key aspects of it. I argue that restricted spending sacrifices crucial information, introduces unnecessary agency costs, and on average transfers funds to times when they are less useful. While there is a place for large and long-lived philanthropic organizations in American society, that role does not require public support for restricted spending. As long as foundations can demonstrate their value to new donors, they will continue to thrive. I set out a series of policy recommendations aimed at better reconciling nonprofit law and the principles that justify it.

I support my claims with new evidence drawn from a data set of over 200,000 firm-year observations of private foundations. For example, I find that foundations earn about twice as much money per year as in earlier studies funded by foundation-industry lobbyists, and that they are growing three times faster than those earlier studies suggests. This finding implies that law could require a much higher annual “payout” from foundations. I also find that new laws introduced in about a dozen states since 2006 have significantly slowed foundation spending in the enacting states. And I offer simulations of several policy proposals for making foundations more effective at fighting recessions.

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Introduction

If the U.S. philanthropic sector---our collection of foundations, or charitable organizations whose main mission is to accumulate wealth and distribute it to other, direct-service, charities---were the output of a nation, it would rank as the product of the world’s sixteenth-largest economy, just behind Mexico, and ahead of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden.¹ Philanthropic institutions on this scale are uniquely American.² Other wealthy nations, such as Great Britain and Germany, have recently begun to develop modest philanthropic sectors, but nothing to rival ours.³ Some of this phenomenon is cultural, an outgrowth of the ideals of the decentralized American state.⁴ Much of it, though, likely owes its success to legal rules that have encouraged the accumulation of philanthropic wealth, including a set of generous federal and state tax subsidies.⁵ In a modern era where wealth and power are growing ever more concentrated, what justifies this use of public funds to underwrite private, if charitable, wealth?

The growth of philanthropic wealth depends on law’s willingness to embrace what I will call a policy of restricted spending. At many charitable organizations, managers are free to spend most or all of the firm’s revenues on current needs, whether they be housing the indigent or curing deadly diseases. Foundations, in contrast, almost uniformly are governed by agreements that prohibit managers from spending more than a small portion of the value of a

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³ Id. at 3–5.
given donors’s gift in any given year. By holding spending down below the annual investment earnings and other income of the foundation, the restricted spending rules permit the organization to grow ever larger.

Law assists the project of restricted spending in a variety of ways. The federal government, and most states, award generous tax incentives for making donations to charity. Those incentives do not depend at all on when the charity spends the donated funds; the government offers the same reward at the time of donation whether the charitable acts actually occur the same year, or centuries in the future. Because donors can usually profitably invest their tax savings over time, this structure provides a powerful incentive to donate first and spend later. In some ways, as I’ll detail, the tax rewards for giving are even higher for gifts to organizations that restrict their spending. Further, state organizational law imposes duties on managers to safeguard the wishes of a donor who wants to see their money last in “perpetuity,” and in more than a dozen states the law actually presumes that managers have failed that duty simply by spending more than seven percent or so of their organization’s assets in any year.

The result is that nearly a trillion dollars of philanthropic wealth now sits on the sidelines, held in abeyance not just for tomorrow, but for the indefinite future. These funds were in considerable measure bolstered by taxes paid by current taxpayers, but the benefits, if they ever arrive, will be enjoyed mostly by future generations.

Surprisingly, there has been little serious scholarly attention to law’s role in restricted spending and the build-up of the philanthropic sector. A handful of think tank white papers and public-policy journal articles have batted around some basic ideas, such as whether we should care about whether public funds pay for charity now or later. The closest to a complete

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7 For detail on the points in this paragraph, see infra Part I.


There have been notable articles analyzing the related question of wealth accumulation by operating charities, such as universities and hospitals. Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments: Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 17 (2011); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. Legal Studies 3, 14–39 (1990). As we will see, that question has some overlap with foundation spending, but also many points of departure.
exploration is an eight-page monograph from the Stanford professor Michael Klausner. There has been no systematic examination of the arguments for and against government supports for restricted-spending foundations, and little effort to link the policy arguments to concrete legal rules. This gap in theorizing has also produced a gap in empirical data: because few people have been formulating the questions, we haven’t had much research to tell us the answers.

This Article attempts to begin all these tasks. I examine critically prior justifications for restricted spending, and offer some new possibilities for consideration. I show that in some cases theory doesn’t take us all the way to a conclusion, and that we need more facts about how donors and foundation managers actually behave. I attempt to fill in some of those facts with original empirical data. And I then connect these tentative findings with some basic principles for reforming the current foundations of the law of restricted spending.

To preview the analysis in a bit more detail, I first examine the social costs of restricted spending rules. As others have acknowledged, setting aside funds for the future reduces the efficacy of the resulting spending by worsening the fit between society’s needs and the donor’s goals, and heightens the cost of separating the uses of the money from the owner’s control. I add that waiting imposes other kinds of costs on governments, beneficiaries, and the foundations themselves. Waiting sacrifices the opportunity to learn from and build on charitable successes and failures. It also shifts money from a time when resources are relatively scarce (now) to a period (the future) when, as I demonstrate with some new evidence, foundations will be flush with cash.

On the other side, I argue that while there are strong arguments for encouraging savings by charities, these arguments mostly don’t support current restricted spending rules. For example, it is true that foundations can develop expertise in their chosen policy areas, and can serve as laboratories and incubators for new ideas. But preserving these incubators doesn’t demand restricted spending, as long as managers are willing to seek out new funding---as indeed most commentators believe they should. I also suggest that charity can usefully save to prepare for times of future great need---but this implies that the organization should also be free to spend profligately when the need arrives.

These analyses supply some basic principles for reforming current law. While I leave development of exact details to await later work and better data, I argue that at a minimum federal law should require many foundations to pay out a considerably larger share of their assets each year than it now does. Congress also should close the loopholes presented by lightly-regulated alternatives to the foundation form, especially those offered by the so-called donor advised funds. At the same time, good policy might additionally include rewards or other

12 For discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
positive incentives, especially incentives for foundations to spend or loan out money during recessions. State tax law could mirror these changes, and states should likely abandon the current movement to impose a legal cap on annual foundation spending.

At each stage of the analysis I supplement my argument with original empirical data. Drawing on a database spanning twenty-five years and thousands of foundations, I am able to offer at least preliminary evidence on several key questions underlying the restricted spending debate. I find, for example, that foundation investments grow at about double the rate claimed in earlier work funded by the foundation industry. I also find that, including new contributions, foundation wealth is growing at more than triple the rate advocates of restricted spending have suggested. The data suggest that state laws setting a defeasible cap on spending in fact have diminished spending. And I am able to run simulations to compare several different policies for curing the problem of pro-cyclical foundation spending. While these findings are hardly the last word on foundation spending, they helpfully fill in holes in our current understanding.

Part I of the Article lays out more detailed background on philanthropy and the laws that subsidize it. In Part II, I consider Prof. Klausner’s arguments that the concept of the time value of money should not apply to foundations, and show several significant gaps in his claims. Part III delves into the social costs of restricted spending, while Part IV reviews old and new arguments in its favor. Part V synthesizes the two into a set of policy implications. The Appendix sets out technical details of the empirical analysis appearing throughout.

I. Background

Let’s begin by clearing up some terminology. A foundation, in the ordinary use of that word, is a charitable institution that exists to give away money, usually to other charities. The Tax Code’s definition doesn’t quite line up with general English usage. In tax lingo, a “private foundation” is an organization whose revenues are drawn from just a few sources. In contrast, a “public charity” is generally one whose support is derived from a relatively broad cross-section of the public. Private foundations are subject to rules and regulations, and even a small tax, that private charities are exempted from.

Thus, some entities that the general public would think of as “foundations” are not foundations for tax purposes. A common example are the so-called “community foundations,” which collect small donations from the public and spend them in a concentrated geographic area. Other entities that the tax code treats as “private foundations” may distribute few funds, and instead concentrate on direct charitable service; these the code calls “private operating

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13 ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 16.03 (Matthew Bender 2011).
14 Id. at 17-2.
foundations.” Since public-charity grant-makers and private operating foundations are few in comparison to other private foundations, in this Article I’ll use the term “foundation” to refer generically to grant-making institutions.

A major recent alternative to the foundation form is the donor advised fund, or “DAF.” A DAF is just an account, managed by a “sponsoring” nonprofit, holding assets contributed by a donor. The donor retains the right to “advise” the nonprofit on how to spend the money, although once placed in the account those funds can be used only to support the sponsor or other charities. Since sponsors know they won’t receive new contributions if they ignore their donors’ “advice,” as a practical matter the donor remains in control of the funds. Nonetheless, the donor can claim a full deduction at the time the money is placed in the account. Often the sponsor will qualify as a “public charity,” since by sponsoring many accounts it can claim that its revenues derive from a broad cross-section of the community. From the donor’s perspective, though, the DAF works much like a mini foundation, albeit not subject to the extra rules that usually go with the foundation form.

The vast majority of foundations follow a policy of what I will call “restricted spending.” Through the firm’s organizational documents and governing state law, the foundation’s managers are constrained to spend only a small fraction of the available assets each year. Sometimes this constraint will be phrased as a percentage of the value of the firm’s assets, while in other instances it will be a more general instruction to pursue a strategy that will preserve the organization’s assets “in perpetuity.”

As other scholars have demonstrated, the law is not simply neutral towards restricted spending and the goal of perpetuity, but rather actively supports them. The charitable contribution deduction is the first and probably largest support. The federal government and most states allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable income by the amount of any donation to an eligible charity. Similarly, decedents’ estates can deduct the amount of any money left to charity from the amount subject to federal tax. In effect, the deduction is a matching grant for the production of charitable goods.

17 IRC § 4942(j)(3).
18 GIVING USA 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, at 74.
19 IRC § 170(f)(18).
21 Marsh, supra note 16, at 147.
22 See supra note 6.
25 IRC § 170(a).
26 Id. § 2055.
Allowing foundation donors to claim their deduction at the time of contribution creates powerful incentives to give far in advance of when the donor wants the money spent.\textsuperscript{28} By accelerating her donation, the donor can get the benefit of the government’s subsidy sooner, and invest that money in the interim. This allows her to spend more in the future, or, alternately, to obtain the same future spending amount with a smaller out-of-pocket outlay.

Commentators disagree about whether these incentives are costly to the government. Michael Klausner points out that in many circumstances delayed spending does not cost the government anything.\textsuperscript{29} Assuming that the foundation’s assets are invested as profitably as the government’s money would have been, the delay does not reduce the present value of the government’s subsidy.

An immediate deduction also makes restricted spending appealing if the donor can make partial use of her money in the interim. For example, commentators note that control of a foundation and its resources gives the donor prestige, power, and influence.\textsuperscript{30} To the extent that donating money directly to an operating charity would not bring these same rewards, establishing a foundation looks relatively more attractive. This can be true of the estate tax deduction, as well. For instance, suppose that Leona calculates that her heirs will want to give some money to charity during their lifetimes. If she sets aside some money from her estate into a family foundation, she can give her heirs three benefits: money to spend on charity, the power and prestige of the foundation, and relief from the estate tax. If she simply left them the money, they would get only the cash left after the estate tax’s bite.\textsuperscript{31}

A less-familiar aspect of the rule allowing full deductibility for restricted-spending gifts is that it facilitates tax planning. Donors can contribute at the moment that the deduction will generate maximum value---usually when their tax rate is highest or the value of the assets they are contributing is at its peak---again without having to trade off that goal against their preference for when to fund charitable projects.\textsuperscript{32}

Thus a common piece of tax advice often given to entrepreneurs whose firms are about to go public is that they should contribute a portion of their stock to a new foundation or DAF.\textsuperscript{33} Assuming that the entrepreneur was planning to donate someday, donating at the moment of the


\textsuperscript{30} Levine \& Sansing, \textit{supra} note 28, at 169.

\textsuperscript{31} Of course, this account assumes that Leona cares about the well-being of her heirs.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{See} Marsh, \textit{supra} note 16, at 171 (noting that DAFs allow donors to claim deductions in high-income years).

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{E.g.}, Ryan Boland, \textit{The First (and Often Forgotten) Rule of Impactful Giving: Give the Right Asset}, PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES, Oct. 2014, at 147, 152--53. DAFs have the advantage that they allow a full market-value deduction for the founder’s stock, even if not publicly traded. \textit{Id.} at 152.
IPO accelerates the deduction during a year when the entrepreneur’s tax rate is as high as it will ever be, and also allows the entrepreneur to claim the value of the donated stock as a deduction at a time when that value, too, may be at its peak.34 Government loses not only because of the timing and the rate shift, but also because the value of the stock at the time it’s ultimately sold for charitable purposes may be rather less than the value of the deduction the donor claimed.

As Dan Halperin has shown, another major tax subsidy for restricted spending is the exclusion of foundation investment earnings from the corporate income tax.35 By contributing their investment assets to a foundation earlier than they want the funds spent, donors can allow those investments to grow tax-free. In contrast, if they held the investment themselves, they would often have to pay tax on any appreciation.

Prof. Halperin acknowledges the counter-argument that other tax rules might allow for effectively the same treatment, but this may be an unnecessary concession.36 Donors who contribute publicly-traded stock to a foundation can deduct the full value of the gift without paying tax on their built-in gains, seemingly achieving the same end result as early contribution.37 To avoid all tax on her donated assets, though, the donor must never exchange them, from the day she acquires them until the day they are donated. This lock-in is itself economically costly, since it prevents the donor from switching away from under-performing investments.38 At the margin, we would expect donors to accept a lock-in cost of just a hair short of the full amount of the tax saved.39 So the ability to contribute built-in gain securities with no tax is less valuable than it appears at first glance.

Finally, in addition to tax law, other legal rules help to underwrite restricted spending. The state law of nonprofit organizations obliges managers to obey the wishes of a donor who chooses to limit the uses of her money.40 Charitable trusts are exempt from the rule against perpetuities.41 Other rules set a default that managers must operate a foundation with the goal of preserving its resources in perpetuity.42 As with the laws of contract and business corporations, the existence of a judicial apparatus for enforcing these guidelines is itself a modest subsidy.43 More significantly, and unlike an ordinary business corporation, state attorneys general are

34 See David Yermack, Deduction ad Absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to Their Own Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 110 (2009) (reporting that stock donated to foundations tends to decline in value after donation).
35 Halperin, supra note 24, at 288, 302, 305.
36 Halperin, supra note 24, at 308.
37 See Brody, supra note 9, at 944.
38 See generally James M. Poterba, Taxation, Risk Taking, and Household Portfolio Behavior, in 3 HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS Ch. 17 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (describing effects of taxation on portfolio allocation).
39 Id.
40 Brody, supra note 9, at 877--80.
41 Id. at 878.
42 Uniform Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act § 4(a), (d) (2006).
charged with enforcing managers’ adherence to nonprofit law. Few do so with much vigor, but donors can and often do choose to incorporate in states, such as New York and California, with the most active AG offices.

In sum, the law not only tolerates restricted spending, but instead actively encourages donations to restricted spending organizations. My goal for the remainder of the Article will be to try to understand what, if anything, can justify that choice.

II. The Time Value of Charity: A Framework for Analysis

Restricted spending policies defer charitable good deeds into the future. How should policy makers compare charity now against the benefit of charity later? One standard tool in most policy contexts is present value, also called time discounting, analysis. Over the rest of this Article, I will employ time discounting analysis to evaluate restricted spending policies. The basic process is intuitive: I will ask whether the social welfare produced by subsidizing restricted spending policies is greater or less than other possible uses of the government's money. Before I do that, though, I must deal with a major critique of time discounting raised by Professor Klausner, who claims that time discounting is “irrelevant” to the merits of restricted spending. In this Part I will show that Klausner description of the significance of time discounting is no longer the most persuasive, and that in the end present value is and must be a key part of serious policy analysis. That will set the stage for the two Parts to follow, each of which is in a sense aimed at identifying what components should go into our present-value analysis.

A. Time Discounting: A Review

It may be useful for some readers to begin with a review of the idea of the time value of money. Most readers know that, all else equal, the average investor would rather have money now than later. Suppose Kent loans money to Lois. While Lois has the funds, Kent cannot invest them. Therefore, Kent will want Lois to compensate him for the alternative investments he could have made in the meanwhile. To simplify a bit, these alternative investments are the time value of Kent’s money. We might then describe the value of some future promise to pay in terms of its “discounted present value.” By this we just mean: how much money would Kent

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47 Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 16 (6th ed. 2000)
48 Klausner, supra note 10, at 53.
49 Brealey & Myers, supra note 47, at 16.
50 Id. at 22. A more complete version of the tale would also account for the risk Kent takes that Lois might not repay. We might then separate the time value of money into purely riskless waiting, “the risk-free rate of return,” and a component that reflects the risky aspects. But that nuance isn’t particularly important for our analysis here.
51 Id. at 18–19.
have to invest today, in order to have that much money at the time of Lois’s promised payment? The “discount rate” is the rate of return that Kent would have earned on his money.\(^{52}\)

We can extend this same concept to governments. When a policy maker is considering “investing” in some policy that will pay off in the future, she should want to think about her opportunity cost. Which will have a better payoff: building this bridge, or instead investing the same money, collecting the proceeds, and spending the money later (on a bridge or anything else)? Using present-value analysis to appraise the future value of projects implicitly builds in this opportunity-cost calculation: the policy maker is deciding how many future dollars she is giving up, assuming she could invest at the chosen discount rate.\(^{53}\)

Using market rates of return to calculate the government’s discount rate is a bit controversial. Theorists from administrative law to environmental economics debate over the “social discount rate.”\(^{54}\) That is, they sometimes disagree over whether we should think of the costs of waiting for a good policy to go into effect as the same as waiting to be paid off on a loan, and if so, what we should think of as the rate of interest.\(^{55}\) But there is no similar dispute over whether we should evaluate a purely monetary future payoff against the government’s substitute investment options.\(^{56}\)

Even less controversially, essentially every commentator agrees that the discount rate should at least include a factor, often referred to with the greek letter theta (“\(\theta\)”), to account for relative changes in wealth across time.\(^{57}\) Humans experience diminishing marginal utility from wealth; each dollar is more important to us when we have only a handful of them than when we have vaults stuffed with them.\(^{58}\) If future beneficiaries of government spending will be richer than we are in the present---as everyone expects they will be, on average---then the future utility payoff from government spending is correspondingly lower.\(^{59}\)

It might be helpful to consider a simple example. Suppose that government is choosing between three options: 1. award $500,000 directly to operating charities today; 2. award $2m directly to operating charities fourteen years from now; and 3. award $500,000 to a foundation today, which will in turn award its investment balance to operating charities fourteen years from

\[^{52}\] Id. at 17.
\[^{53}\] Id. at 16.
\[^{56}\] See Revesz & Shahabian, *supra* note 54, at 1145 (conceding importance of discounting but raising special considerations in the context of climate change).
now. Let us say that the market rate of return on investments is around 10%, which would allow a $500,000 investment to grow to $2m in fourteen years.

If we set aside \( \theta \), and assume that it doesn’t matter which entity awards money to operating charities, government should be indifferent between these three choices. All three have a present value of $500,000: in order to get a $2m payoff from the foundation in fourteen years, government must spend $500,000 today, and setting aside the money for investment can’t best that return. However, if we also consider \( \theta \), we likely would prefer option one (spending now) over the other two. All the options have a $500,000 present cost, but the payoff to options two and three is less valuable, because giving money to the future is not as useful as spending it now.

What would have to be true in order for option three, the foundation investment, to be the best choice? To prevail over option one, it would have to be the case that the present discounted value of option three is more than $500,000, discounting it by both the government’s rate of return and \( \theta \). Government shouldn’t give up $500,000 worth of present consumption unless the utility of the future payoff is greater than the utility earned by investing the money.  

Now, what if it does matter who spends the money, and how? Suppose that we think that social problems will get much worse over the next decade, so that every dollar of charity spent in 2029 will have a much bigger impact. Then the utility payoff of each future dollar will be larger, so that in present-value terms, allocating money to investment or the foundation could be the better option. Or, as I will argue in Parts III and IV, suppose that we believe that parking funds at a foundation actually reduces the usefulness of money we set aside now. Then, the present utility value of underwriting the foundation is less than either spending it now or investing it for use by the government later.

**B. Is Time Money for Foundations?**

Let’s turn now to Klausner’s critique. Although Professor Klausner makes much of his rejection of time discounting, at the end of the day he accepts most of this framework. He agrees that the relative wealth of current and future generations is an important factor in the spend/save decision. And, consistent with the discounting literature, he concludes that charities should consider “how cost-effective a grant to current charity would be, compared to future charity”---that is, that foundations should consider opportunity costs. He maintains, though, that foundation savings shouldn’t be compared against the government’s investment return or short-run charitable projects---that is, he would refuse to make either of the comparisons we just undertook in our simple example. But both his claims rest on mistaken assumptions.

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60 Bradley et al., *supra* note 9, at 7.
62 *Id.* at 57; see also Hansmann, *supra* note 9, at 14.
63 Klausner, *supra* note 10, at 57; see also Schramm, *supra* note 9, at 400.
First, Klausner’s description of the reason planners discount future payoffs by the government’s investment rate is less convincing than other accounts. Klausner claims that “by discounting future grants to present value, we would be saying that” future people’s lives are less important “simply because [they] live at different times.” As David Weisbach and Cass Sunstein have explained, however, we could value future and present lives equally and still want to consider the government’s opportunity cost. Indeed, to do otherwise would be unethical: it would be throwing money away, money that could benefit the present and future both. Again, by applying a market discount rate, in effect we are asking, “Which would produce more wealth for the future: funding this project, or investing the money?” If the project would pay less than an investment would, how does it serve the future to fund the project?

Klausner also is unpersuasive when he suggests that foundations (and, presumably, the society the subsidizes them) need not weigh the benefit of restricted spending against the lost opportunity to fund short-term projects. That is, his view seems to be that foundations don’t have to show that their investment returns exceed the “return” that spending could produce. There are many ways charitable spending today could benefit the future. Economic development might create a path of economic growth that enriches later generations. Future research could build on present-day discoveries. But Klausner seemingly would consider these alternatives only if the social return “continues in perpetuity” and “produces benefits that compound…at a higher rate than assets in the foundation’s portfolio.”

It looks, therefore, as though Klausner’s objection to considering opportunity costs is about math. The idea seems to be that, over an infinite amount of time, a foundation’s investment returns will outstrip the value of any finite spending project. Only spending projects whose benefits continue indefinitely are a better choice than investing, and even then only if their “rates of return” are consistently higher. This fits with standard models of capital budgeting—that is, plans for how to allocate firm resources over time—which suggest that firms spend so as to obtain an equal marginal return on their expenditures in each time period. If the firm plans to exist for an indefinite period, and if we assume that on average the returns on expenditures are similar each year, it should spend roughly its net-of-inflation investment returns each year. Spending out of principal would reduce the marginal payoff in future periods, unless that extra spending could itself provide value in future years in excess of the investment return.

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64 Id. at 53--54.
65 Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 450--51.
66 Klausner, supra note 10, at 55.
67 BREST & HARVEY, supra note 9, at 261; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 4--5.
68 Irvin, supra note 9, at 448.
69 Klausner, supra note 10, at 55, 57.
70 See ARROW & KURZ, supra note 55, at xx -- xxi.
While the math here is right, the assumption that foundations will exist literally forever is very implausible. Realistically, no foundation will live on in perpetuity, even if we can’t now predict its exact end date. So it is inaccurate to compute the value of investing by assuming an infinite life. But how long should we assume? Often, the answer doesn’t matter. Imagine that we are comparing the value of investing against a spending project, using the standard compound-returns formula to compute each one:

\[
(U_i = P_0 (1 + r_i)^n) > < (U_s = P_0 (1 + r_s)^m)
\]

(1)

where \(U_i\) and \(U_s\) are the utility payoffs from investing and spending, \(r\) is the annual rate of return on each option, and \(n\) and \(m\) are the expected life spans of the foundation and the spending project, respectively. If \(n\) and \(m\) are equal, then we can cancel them from each side of the inequality, with the result that we would choose whichever option has a higher rate of return.

The expected life of the foundation will often drop out of our calculations in this way because many projects a foundation takes on will have an expected life as long as the foundation itself. Perhaps investing in advances in chemotherapy will not have an infinite payout, assuming that someday gene therapy will supersede chemo as a leading cancer treatment. Will that day come before or after foundations are no longer a sensible social arrangement, laws change, or future managers of the foundation find a way to bring its operations to a halt? We don’t know, and that makes the expected life of the investment effectively the same as that of the foundation.

Where then does this analysis leave us? As Klausner concedes, foundations’ decisions to restrict their spending should be measured against the lost opportunities this decision presents. Doing otherwise would cheat future generations as much as it would cheat present-day taxpayers. In addition, I’ve argued here that to justify government support for restricted spending, foundation savings should have to beat two benchmarks. First, the utility payoff to future spending—net of all the costs and benefits that delay might bring—should exceed the government’s investment opportunity: when the government gives foundations a dollar, the utility of future spending should equal or exceed the utility we could get from a dollar of present spending. Second, the net payoff should exceed any returns that the foundation could achieve by spending now on projects whose useful life is expected to be just as “perpetual” as the foundation itself.

III. The Costs of Waiting

My argument so far is that it is important to consider whether the future payoffs that a restricted-spending foundation can deliver are better than the alternatives of unrestricted spending, or of eliminating the government’s subsidy and investing that money for some other

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\(^{72}\text{Cf. Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 454--55 (noting that duration of any inter-generational transfer is uncertain because of possibility of acts by intervening generations).}\)

\(^{73}\text{Hansmann, supra note 9, at 18.}\)
kind of future spending instead. In this Part, therefore, I examine some factors that might potentially diminish the value of charitable spending deferred by foundations into the future. I show that short-term spending can have long-lasting impact, that future charitable spending is likely to be less valuable because the growing philanthropic sector will have to turn to lower-priority projects, and that spreading spending out over time introduces several different forms of agency and information costs. In the last subpart, I’ll discuss a counter-argument that might apply to all these points: that the charitable contribution deduction, by its very nature, commits the decision to accept these costs to charities, not the government.

**A. Opportunity Costs: Forever is Shorter Than You Think**

First, as we saw in Part II.B., even proponents of restricted spending agree that foundations could increase returns to society by investing in projects that last in perpetuity. Realistically speaking, those projects don’t have to last forever to, in expectation, beat foundation savings; they just have to have an expected life that approximates the foundation’s own. Every one of these projects that goes unfunded due to government policies favoring foundation savings is a waste of resources. If projects with this kind of indefinitely-lived value are rare, though, perhaps this is a minor concern.

In fact, though, because foundations are engines for innovation, it could well be that almost every project a foundation engages in potentially has value that could continue growing as long as the foundation itself. It might be the case that grants to provide hospice care for the terminally ill won’t much benefit the future directly, but discovering new methods for delivering that care likely will. Every project the foundation engages in can potentially be a source of information for the next grant, for other operating charities, and for other foundations.74 Foundation advocates claim repeatedly that foundations are almost unique in society in their power to use their grant-making ability to experiment, measure outcomes, and derive lessons for the future.75 If so, though, delays in grant-making also deny the world the opportunity to benefit from those lessons.

Even if not every project has this informational value, the claim that time-limited projects inevitably pale in comparison to an opportunity to invest forever is overstated. Again, it is unrealistic to believe foundations really are timeless. Few foundations in the world today are more than one hundred years old.76 Compound interest for a hundred years or two is powerful, but many time-limited projects could well rival that return, especially if we expect that the product could outlive foundations themselves.

74 FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 3—9; Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 123—25.
75 BREST & HARVEY, supra note 9, at 262—63; Schramm, supra note 9, at 398—400, 404.
76 ZUNZ, supra note 5, at 37—68.
B. Diminishing Marginal Returns: Redistribution and the Growth of the Foundation Sector

Next, future spending might deliver a smaller payoff than spending today because of diminishing marginal returns. We have already seen one aspect of that argument: future generations could be wealthier than ours, on average. That implies that, if anything, we should borrow money from the future and spend it today.\(^{77}\)

Another possibility, with similar implications, is that the foundation sector itself could be growing. Let’s assume that foundations tend to fund their highest-value projects first, however subjectively value is defined.\(^{78}\) As the foundation sector expands, it will have to choose projects lower and lower down on its list. The same is true of each individual foundation, assuming that foundation managers have somewhat idiosyncratic tastes relative to other managers: as the foundation gets richer, its marginal project has a lower payoff. Standard capital budgeting theory, we’ve seen, prescribes that a firm in that situation should shift the money to a time period when its marginal returns will be higher.\(^{79}\)

What’s happening to the size of foundations, and to the foundation sector overall? In Part V.B.2., I report new empirical findings on the rate of growth of foundation assets. To preview briefly, I find steady growth in the real (i.e., net of inflation) value of private foundations’ assets, including investment income and new donations but omitting expenditures---in other words, in the amount of money that would be available for spending. Together, new contributions and investment earnings offer a mean growth rate of about 18%, after inflation. The foundation sector, in other words, is growing rapidly, and those figures do not include the even-faster expansion of donor advised funds.

Unless Congress has some reason to believe that the marginal value of future charitable spending will be much, much higher than in the present, this trend seems to fly in the face of the capital budgeting principles I’ve just outlined. Today’s foundations should to some extent borrow against the value of future foundation growth, by spending down their assets and letting new money replace those funds.\(^{80}\) To equalize marginal returns in each period, assuming that on average projects of equal value are available each year, foundations could spend up to their growth rate each year --- here, on the order of 18% of their assets annually.

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\(^{77}\) Hansmann, supra note 9, at 14.

\(^{78}\) See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 47, at 257--82 (describing methods of prioritizing projects for firms).

\(^{79}\) Cf. Halperin, supra note 9, at [53] (suggesting that endowment spending rules should account for future contributions); Timothy Yoder & Brian P. McAllister, Do Private Foundations Increase Current Distributions to Qualify for a 50 Percent Tax Rate Reduction?, 34 J. AM. ACCOUNTING ASS’N 45, 51 (2012) (“By distributing assets contemporaneously, foundations reduce their ability to distribute assets in the future when a higher philanthropic return may be available.”).

\(^{80}\) Cf. Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 6--7 (“The availability of … new funds for giving in the future should make higher levels of giving today more appealing.”).
C. Project Selection, Agency Costs, and Information

As many prior commentators have observed, stretching foundation spending over time tends to reduce the value of that spending through two additional mechanisms. One is agency costs: over time, it becomes harder for donors to constrain the impulses of managers, who may prefer to hold down spending in order to shield themselves from risk and reduce effort, or to spend in ways that contravene the donor’s preferences. Another is information: even if donors could perfectly control their agents, the donor’s ability to best target her spending will get ever more stale over time. In this subpart I want to add some less-familiar aspects of these problems.

First, and most simply, a relatively unfamiliar argument about restricted spending is that it presents an informational dilemma for the government as well as for donors. In theory, government subsidies or other incentives should be attuned so that the marginal social benefit generated by another dollar of charitable activity is equal to the incentive’s marginal cost. Restricted spending forces the government to forecast both, and the more restricted the spending is, the longer the range of the forecast. As the forecast gets fuzzier, the likelihood increases that government will do something socially wasteful: either over-pay to encourage behavior that is not cost-effective, or underpay and leave some beneficial behavior still on the table. Some scholars have argued that, when the government faces this level of uncertainty about the payoff from its policies, it should not award up-front subsidies at all, but instead wait until after the behavior it wants to encourage.

Second, recent work on the psychology of foundation managers suggests yet another possible wedge that time might drive between the manager and donor. Studies of foundation managers report that they are often motivated in significant part by the amount of the assets under their control, rather than by what those assets can accomplish---a classic example of “empire building.” Managers also tend to favor accumulation over program activities because

81 Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers Part I: The Process, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 117, 118 (1992); see Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 7–8; see also id. at 11 (noting that managers prefer restricted spending because it protects their jobs, but describing this as an argument in favor of the practice). For evidence, see Core et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 309; Mihir A. Desai & Robert J. Yetman, Constraining Managers Without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, NBER Working Paper No. 11140, at 18 (Feb. 2005).
82 Brody, supra note 9, at 919, 922, 942; Hansmann, supra note 9, at 33–34; Irvin, supra note 9, at 449. But see Fleishman, supra note 9, at 246–47 (2007) (arguing that foundations are valuable because they “allow the values of past generations to provide a counterweight to…the present).
83 GRUBER, supra note 58, at 135.
84 Recall that under current law, restricted spending is subsidized both through an up-front tax deduction and also by an ongoing exemption for the investment returns of the charity.
85 Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J. L. & ECON. S249, 256 (2011)
of measurability bias: it is easier to evaluate the performance of the firm’s investments than its programs, and hence managers favor investing over spending.\(^8^8\)

A last point also deals with information, but it will take a bit of unpacking. Let’s begin by returning to the idea that firms optimally allocate their resources when they equalize the marginal returns to spending in each time period. This is as true of donee firms, the operating charities, as it is for foundations. Restricted spending can interfere with operating charities’ ability to allocate their money. In essence, restricted spending forces some operating charities to wait to obtain resources that in some cases could have been spent more efficiently in earlier periods. For instance, it is unlikely that the best use of a soup kitchen’s money is to have zero dollars for four years and then a million dollars in the fifth, rather than $200,000 each year. Of course, if the operating foundation could borrow, this wouldn’t be a problem, but most charities are severely credit-constrained,\(^8^9\) and many nonprofit managers are averse to taking on debt that could increase the risk of bankruptcy.\(^9^0\)

Foundations could overcome this problem if they had perfect information about the plans and operations of the donee firms. A perfectly-informed foundation would parcel out more or less money to each donee each year, depending on the payoff. In other words, the foundation would make grants that match the spending pattern the operating foundation would choose. The problem, of course, is that the foundation managers don’t have that information, and they usually can’t rely on the donee firm to provide it. This information asymmetry problem comes up in many other contexts, such as in government grants and in insurer-insured relationships.\(^9^1\) In the literatures studying those fields, scholars report that information transfers are imperfect because one party may have incentives to only convey information favorable to their interests, because information-gathering is costly, and because some crucial information may be hard to reduce to writing.\(^9^2\)

An alternative strategy for the foundation would be simply to award all the money it plans to give to an operating charity up front, and let the donee firm allocate those funds over time, but that plan also has problems. Once the donee firm has the funds, its managers may slack or diverge from the plans they promised. Those managers also are unlikely to surrender the funds in the event some other, more productive, project appears at another firm. Therefore, a

\(^8^8\) Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 15.
\(^8^9\) Brody, supra note 9, at 889; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 877 (1980).
\(^9^0\) Hansmann, supra note 9, at 36.
\(^9^2\) KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1986).
donor might be willing to incur the information costs of holding back funds in order to obtain greater accountability and flexibility.  

While at first glance this theory seems to support restricted spending by foundations, in fact it undermines it. Individual donors could obtain the benefits of accountability and flexibility by holding donated funds in their own name, and then contributing directly to operating charities when the time seems right.\textsuperscript{94} Adding a foundation in between, and directing it to restrict its spending, introduces exactly the two problems that waiting supposedly solves: it allows the foundation managers to diverge from the donor’s preferences, and it reduces flexibility. Once funds are contributed to the foundation, they cannot lawfully be returned to the donor.\textsuperscript{95} This means that, if the donor comes upon a highly productive investment opportunity, she can’t shift money from the foundation to that use (and then potentially back again). While perhaps the foundation sometimes could pursue the opportunity, we know from recent work in international taxation that the “lock up” of assets inside a firm can create severe economic distortions, due to the fact that the identity of the owner of an investment can matter a lot to how well that investment pays off.\textsuperscript{96} Professors Klick and Sitkoff have shown evidence of that very effect in the foundation context.\textsuperscript{97}

In short, restricted spending foundations are likely to be less efficient than foundations that award their funds quickly, because donee firms have better information about when that money should be spent. Although donors may be willing to pay that information cost in order to gain accountability and flexibility, foundations reduce those two very things. The factors could net out to either social gains or losses from foundation restricted spending, but we presently have no evidence on how they play out. For now, if we assume that they roughly balance out on average, the net result is that restricted spending foundations create imperfect information without any offsetting benefit.

Having said all of that, there may be some situations in which it would be beneficial for society to encourage donors to “lock up” their assets in a foundation, even if that strategy reduces the value of the assets. For instance, lock ups may be a way of transferring resources


\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{FLEISHMAN}, supra note 9, at 240--41 (2007) (noting that the two options are often equivalent).

\textsuperscript{95} IRC §§ 170(f)(3), 2055(e)(2).


from a time when they have a low marginal utility (say, a booming economy) to a time when they will have a higher marginal utility (say, a recession). We’ll return to that thought in Part IV.

D. Let Charity Decide?

Before moving on, though, I want to consider a counter-argument that could be raised to most or all the arguments I’ve addressed in this Part. A standard view among most scholars of the nonprofit sector is that the foibles of managers and errors of donors are the price society must pay for the private production of public goods. That is, since one of the central goals of charity is to challenge or provide an alternative to majoritarian government, the assumption is that it would be counter-productive to have government bureaucrats or elected officials second-guessing or influencing charities’ choices. Putting this point another way, we might say that the majority’s dislike for a charity’s choices shouldn’t count as an additional cost, since that very dislike is a reason for the subsidy. For instance, I suggested that restricted spending could cause undesirable redistribution, but some commentators believe that charities should be free to be as redistributive (or not) as they choose.

Whatever its general merits, this argument is not very persuasive as a justification for policies that actually encourage restricted spending. It is one thing to accept what to government eyes is wasteful charity when that is the price of vibrant and diverse uses of the charitable contribution deduction. It is another for government deliberately to set in place additional policies that encourage waste. That is, if the only question were whether restricted-spending charities should be eligible for the same subsidies all others charities can claim, the answer might well be yes. But the question instead is whether government’s extra subsidies for restricted spending---full deductions at the time of contribution, exemption of investment earnings, and so on---can be justified. Denying those subsidies does not sacrifice charitable autonomy, since those funds could be given over to present-day charity instead.

Limits on charitable choice are often defensible, in any event. For example, when charities produce significant negative externalities, the diversity rationale is harder to invoke: the charity is not only going its own way, but is also dragging others along. As I’ve argued elsewhere, the assumption that government cannot limit some charitable decisions without threatening charitable independence underestimates tools of the modern administrative state. For instance, clear and simple rules can limit the discretion of government actors who might disfavor unpopular charities. Judicial review, and the threat of it and other kinds of outside evaluation, also constrain administrative biases.

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99 Fleishman, supra note 9, at 23–24.
Limiting restricted spending fits this model of where enforcement is viable. Restricted spending deprives the future of information, renders operating charities less efficient, imposes added enforcement costs on state attorneys general and the IRS, and creates unwanted redistribution. With a few mechanical rules, such as guidelines on how rapidly a firm should spend its assets, many of these problems could be curtailed. Part V addresses some of these rules in more detail.

IV. The Value of Future Spending

So far I’ve argued that restricted spending is socially costly in several important respects. I now turn to considering the other side: what are the benefits of paying out slowly over time? Earlier commentators have identified four main arguments in favor of restricted spending. One, the idea of intergenerational equity, we’ve already seen. That claim ultimately depends on whether future spending might be more valuable than spending today. While the other four arguments bear on that point, none are persuasive. At best, they weigh in favor of long-lived entities, but not necessarily long-term restrictions on spending by those entities. But there are some other possibilities that have not been seriously developed elsewhere that merit more thoughtful consideration. In particular, the latent power of foundations to buoy the economy during recessions, and to rival the national government, both could justify relatively long-term spending projects. I argue, though, that neither of these goals merits a permanent endowment; both counsel that at some point spending limits should be lifted.

A. Prior Justifications for Restricted Spending

Prior authors set out four basic claims about why restricted spending might be more valuable than other forms of charity. Most simply, they claim that donors value perpetual life. This claim underwrites two separate rationales for subsidizing perpetuities: first, that perpetual life increases the “warm glow” donors experience, and second, that in doing so it also triggers increased total giving. Third, commentators argue that foundations have institutional expertise or economies of scope that make their spending more efficient, so that it would be wasteful for them to close their doors after spending down their endowment. Lastly, foundation advocates claim that a foundation’s best project might not arise for many years. None of these claims survives careful scrutiny.

102 Prior commentators have suggested that foundations could help to fight recessions, Boris & Steuerle, supra note 3; Desai & Yetman, supra note 81, at 8, but have not explained why this should be a task for the nonprofit sector in particular.
103 Irvin, supra note 9, at 449.
105 Karst, supra note 98, at 475.
106 See infra Part IV.A.3.
1. Donor Preferences for Restricted Spending

No doubt, donors value long-lasting recognition for their generosity. A visit to the entry hall of any museum or opera house can tell us that. Some commentators suggest that the opportunity to satisfy these preferences is itself a reason to favor perpetual gifts. Alternately, and I think more plausibly, others claim that allowing long-term restrictions on gifts, especially restrictions on spending, encourages donors to give.

I should first note that, as several eminent commentators have observed, there is no empirical support for the proposition that restricted spending encourages donations. Donors may like perpetuities, but it could be that those who value perpetuities the most are those who were already the most inclined to donate. While prior studies find that donors actively shop for states that will allow perpetual trusts, that jurisdictional competition seems entirely driven by federal tax benefits that accompany trusts with unlimited lives.

In any event, the possibility that donors have preferences for limited spending argues for lesser, not greater, government cash subsidies for limited-spending gifts. In essence, we could think of the two approaches, tax subsidies and government support for restricted spending, as substitutes. I agree on this front with John Colombo, who points out that government is justified in offering subsidies when markets fail, but that markets for naming rights seem to function just fine. The more donors want to give, the less the government needs to support their giving. If donors want to give more when their gifts can be subject to restricted spending rules, government’s support in dollars can be lower.

In more technical terms, the greater self-satisfaction that comes with permanent recognition implies that those donors are likely to be infra-marginal: the government’s cash,

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109 LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 181 (1955); Charles H. Hamilton, Payout Redux, in VIII CONVERSATIONS ON PHILANTHROPY 28, 33 (2011); Brody, supra note 9, at 942; see Drennan, supra note 107, at 253 (noting this argument).
while costly to the public, does not increase the donor’s contribution.\textsuperscript{114} A third closely-related point is that the donors’ utility is private consumption, while optimal subsidies for the production of positive externalities should depend only on the spillover benefits to others.\textsuperscript{115}

Perhaps what prior commentators have meant to say is that rules encouraging the use of perpetuities are a less socially costly way of encouraging giving than tax subsidies.\textsuperscript{116} If so, this claim would be dubious. One reason to doubt it is that the social costs of perpetuities are not measured in any government budget. Since perpetuities are “off budget,” the political discipline that at least gently constrains most tax incentives has not weighed on them.\textsuperscript{117} In other words, it is unlikely that society’s choice to encourage perpetual gifts reflects a considered judgment about their efficiency.

The best argument for the efficiency of perpetuities would likely be the case in which there are some donors with strong preferences for future spending, but only weak sensitivity to cash incentives. A pair of economists recently predicted that perpetuities could increase giving under that assumption.\textsuperscript{118} The existing evidence, though, largely suggests the opposite: wealthy donors are both the most sensitive to tax incentives and also the most likely to give to restricted-spending vehicles.\textsuperscript{119}

Whatever the relative efficiency of taxes and perpetuities as stimulants to giving, there still is no argument for granting more generous tax subsidies when a gift carries spending restrictions. The whole premise of the efficiency argument would be that restricted spending is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 28--29 (2008).
\item In any event, the donor’s utility, properly measured, is likely to be tiny relative to the costs of the government’s subsidies. Once the donor is dead, she no longer can care about her reputation. \textit{But see The Sixth Sense} (Buena Vista Pictures 1999). She might take some bit of added satisfaction during life at the thought of her name being carved in stone. \textit{Kelly, supra} note 108, at 1147--49. But that feeling is fleeting, while the government’s subsidies will, by definition, last in perpetuity.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Or, as Peter Diamond suggests, of reducing the deadweight loss of progressive taxation. Peter Diamond, \textit{Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods with and Without Warm Glow Preferences}, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 898 (2006)
\item \textsuperscript{117} See Steven A. Dean, \textit{The Tax Expenditure Budget is a Zombie Accountant}, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265, 286--88 (2012) (summarizing ways in which budgeting imposes political constraints on spending).
\item \textsuperscript{118} Levine & Sansing, \textit{supra} note 28, at 167.
\item \textsuperscript{119} See Jon Bakija, \textit{Tax Policy and Philanthropy: A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the United State and Its Implications}, 80 SOC. RESEARCH 557, 571 (2013) (finding evidence that price-elasticity of giving is higher among higher-income donors); IRS Statistics of Income, Charitable Giving and the Nonprofit Sector: What Tax Data Can Tell Us (2014) (reporting giving to private foundations is predominantly from top 1% of households by income); LILY FAMILY SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY, GIVING USA 2014, at 140. It is true that some of the reason for the prevalence of wealthy donors in restricted-spending vehicles is the relatively higher transaction costs of that form of giving, so that the pattern of observed giving may not reflect solely the underlying preferences of donors. But the possibility that restricted gifts carry higher transaction costs only serves to make our point about the lower efficiency of that form.
\end{itemize}
useful because it permits lesser tax subsidies. And it is similarly incoherent to offer tax subsidies for perpetuities in order to appeal to donors who are indifferent to tax subsidies.

I should emphasize that I am not proposing to outlaw perpetual gifts. I agree with scholars who maintain that, all else equal, individuals have some right to dispose of their property as they choose. The question for this Part is whether there are reasons to encourage restricted spending.

2. Firm-Specific Value

Another argument sometimes advanced for restricted spending policies is that grant-making institutions add value. For example, Paul Brest, erstwhile Dean of Stanford Law School and former Executive Director of the Hewlett Foundation, argues that major grant-making organizations have developed expertise in their project areas, and have ties to networks of experts who can support, guide, and evaluate the work of the grantees. These kinds of expertise are closely tied up in human capital: the staff’s knowledge, their sense of how to work collaboratively with one another and the outside experts, and their ability to trust the judgment of their working partners. While that kind of capital could be replicated or reassembled, Brest suggests, doing so would be very costly. Why, then, would we want to force such an organization to spend all its money and dissolve?

Another way this point is sometimes put is that foundations generate large economies of scope. Society might get a much bigger bang for its subsidy dollar by underwriting foundations, because the foundation is overseeing many projects at once. That puts the foundation’s staff in a position to be able to compare the projects to each other, see potential synergies, and apply lessons learned in one project to others. Joel Fleishman, a Duke professor who once headed Atlantic Philanthropies, makes a version of this claim when he suggests that foundations are a key source of policy experimentation: the foundation can support several alternative ways of achieving the same policy goal, and then put its money behind the one that proves to work best and advocate for it over time.

These are powerful arguments, but they make a case only for long-lived institutions, not restricted spending. It is true that some organizations, including Fleishman’s own Atlantic Philanthropies, have decided intentionally to spend all of the foundation’s available funds. The Gates Foundation’s organizational documents also reportedly require it to expend all

120 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 33.
121 BREST & HARVEY, supra note 9, at 264.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Triantis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1150.
125 FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 245–46.
available resources within fifty years of the death of its founders. Spending the founder’s money, though, need not mean the end of the organization. Most charities raise new money from donors and other sources. The Gates Foundation, for instance, also received a massive pledge from Warren Buffett, and Buffett demanded that Gates spend some of its preexisting money each year as a condition of receiving his donation.

Admittedly, Buffett’s decision is unusual in that it appears that it is rare for the very largest foundations to receive new contributions after the death of their founder. Individuals who plan on making very large charitable contributions often prefer to establish their own foundation, even when there may already be other successful grant-making institutions pursuing the same goals.

Yet even now, when policy gives them little reason to do so, many foundations readily attract new gifts. In the dataset I constructed, one-third of private foundations receive donations in a year other than their first year in the dataset. Fourteen percent of firm-years see the firm take in more in contributions than it spends. On average, foundations replace about 62 percent of all their expenses with new contributions. I find, as prior researchers also have, that it is mostly the largest and oldest foundations that tend not to receive new gifts.

To the extent that foundations don’t bring in new revenues, the reasons for that failure are not reasons the government should embrace. Donors usually explain their preference for setting up their own foundation as based on their desire to retain maximum control over their gift. Part of it, no doubt, is also ego. Alfred Nobel established his prize to change the legacy attached to his name, not because he loved mankind. Contributing money to a foundation named for someone else wouldn’t likely deliver the same reward. And, although donors rarely say so out loud, controlled private foundations offer greater tax planning opportunities than contributing to someone else’s charity. In addition, managers of an existing foundation may prefer not to seek new revenues because, as I have mentioned, it would tend to make them more

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127 BREST & HARVEY, supra note 9, at 260.
128 FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 237.
130 See id.
131 Yoder & McAllister, supra note 79, at 65.
133 FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at xi (describing this as “the primary driver of the creation of perpetual foundations”).
135 Wendy Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1169--70 (2008). For example, a controlled private foundation can be granted stock without concern that it will exercise its voting rights contrary to the interests of the controlling donor.
accountable to others.\textsuperscript{136} Prior studies also find evidence consistent with the idea that nonprofit managers find fundraising personally unpleasant.\textsuperscript{137}

Still, an advocate for limited spending might say that, given these natural human tendencies, limited spending is the price we must pay in order to get the largest, very long-lived institutions. Yet none of these behaviors is inevitable: for instance, donors also make very large unrestricted gifts to universities—often with some naming rights attached, but not necessarily the power to rename the whole institution.\textsuperscript{138} Managers of operating charities do fundraise, even though they dislike it.\textsuperscript{139} Both parties can be incentivized to do the things that are needed to preserve long-lasting institutions. The question again would be whether limited spending is the least socially costly way of achieving the goal of institutional expertise. If donors are reluctant to give to someone else’s foundation, why not change tax rules to encourage additional giving? Or, if the problem is managers, perhaps imposing a higher mandatory payout rate would motivate managers who want to retain their jobs to work harder to bring in new money.

I also agree with Mark Hall and John Colombo’s argument that the ability to attract new donations is an important signal of an organization’s quality.\textsuperscript{140} If individual donors no longer want to support the mission of a foundation, what does that say about how well-spent the government’s subsidy dollars are? Hall and Colombo’s critique is especially trenchant for large foundations, which long have been criticized for being insular vehicles by which the super-rich can shape society.\textsuperscript{141}

Scholarly work in the cognitive psychology of group decision making also suggests that policy often is best made in settings where decision makers know that there will be opportunities for those with differing points of view to probe and challenge.\textsuperscript{142} In other words, I question whether an organization that need never raise new money really can achieve the kind of institutional expertise and openness to new ideas championed by Profs. Brest and Fleishman. In contrast, rules that incentivize the organization to demonstrate the worth of its mission to

\textsuperscript{136}FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 82; cf. Drennan, supra note 107, at 229 (noting that families may resist giving up control of foundation bearing their name).


\textsuperscript{138}Brody, supra note 9, at 884; Hansmann, supra note 9, at 8.

\textsuperscript{139}Andreoni & Payne, supra note 137, at 335.

\textsuperscript{140}Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1450-51 (1991); see also S. Rep. No. 91-552, note 66, at 662–63; 1969-3 C.B. at 464 (justifying statutory limits on nonprofit borrowing on the ground that nonprofits could otherwise expand without the need for additional donations); Irvin, supra note 9, at 449.


\textsuperscript{142}CARRLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 117-28 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 105-08 (2000). This could also be spun as a negative feature of new donations, however. By introducing new points of view, the charity may cause donors to worry that other donors will act at cross-purposes to their own, introducing cross-monitoring costs. See Triantis, supra note \textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, at 1148.
outsiders help to open doors, or at least windows, into the closed interiors of philanthropic power.

In sum, to the extent that the institutional expertise arguments have any power, it is only with respect to a small subset of restricted-spending organizations. Only those large, old, and vibrant enough to have developed significant irreplaceable human capital, or capable of carrying out extensive policy experimentation, can claim the benefit at all. And only those organizations seem to need restricted spending to protect their extended lives; other philanthropies have little trouble raising new money.

3. Real Option Value of Waiting

A last argument one sometimes reads from restricted-spending advocates is that a foundation’s best project is not always available immediately.\(^{143}\) For instance, the Gates Foundation wants to combat malaria. Should it put all its billions into the first malaria vaccine that comes along? Or should it try to develop several potential solutions, saving its biggest expenditures for the one that proves most promising? This second route has an intuitive appeal, and the underlying insight is sometimes called “real option value.”\(^{144}\) By waiting, we get more information about the world, and that can allow us to make better choices.\(^{145}\)

Economic models of real options suggest that waiting isn’t an unmitigated good.\(^{146}\) Instead, there is an optimal balance between waiting and acting.\(^{147}\) Even for actors with theoretically infinite lives, waiting can mean missing out on opportunities that might have turned out to be the best choice.\(^{148}\) At some point, Gates has to get behind one of its vaccine manufacturers, before they all go out of business. Real option theory may justify some degree of savings, but in the end it’s a theory of action, not inaction.

Real options also don’t offer much support for awarding subsidies to donors at the time of their gift, rather than the time the Foundation spends the contribution. What value is created for society by the Gates Foundation holding Bill Gates’s money as it searches for the best ways to spend it? What difference would it make if Gates himself held the bulk of the funds, then contributed the rest when the Foundation informed him it had found the right target? If anything, placing the money in the Foundation’s hands shifts the administrative costs of investing the funds to the Foundation, and introduces the kind of agency costs I discussed in Part III. Perhaps the firm can do slightly better long-range planning when it has actual title to the donation, rather

\(^{143}\) Irvin, supra note 9, at 450; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 12.
\(^{144}\) Brealey & Myers, supra note 47, at 619; Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder, Valuing Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. Fin. 549, 549--50 (1990).
\(^{145}\) Brealey & Myers, supra note 47, at 625. Relatedly, foundations may serve as intermediaries whose greater capacity to investigate and verify service organizations makes them valuable sources of seed capital. Triantis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1160. But this, too, is a story in which, while savings is useful, the foundation must constantly spend to make the savings worthwhile.
\(^{146}\) Brealey & Myers, supra note 47, at 625--28.
\(^{147}\) Id.
\(^{148}\) Id.
than, say, just a pledge by Gates to commit the money in the future. But that seems a fairly slender benefit.

B. New Arguments for Restricted Spending

In addition to the possibilities other commentators have raised, I want to raise some additional potential benefits to the accumulation of wealth by philanthropic organizations. In earlier theoretical work, I argued that the best justification for subsidies for the charitable sector may be the sector’s potential to achieve what local governments cannot: spend during times of acute need, compete effectively with the federal government, and conduct guided policy experiments, among other goals. Each of these three achievements likely requires some buildup of charitable assets over time. I’ll now claim, however, that rather than prescribing accumulation of unlimited wealth over endless periods of time by private foundations, these policies generally weigh in favor of limited savings, call for occasional aggressive spending, and may make more sense for operating charities than private foundations.

As prelude to this analysis, I should mention that the traditional rationale for government support of charities is that charity is basically a delivery vehicle for positive-externality goods that neither government nor market would otherwise provide. So, for example, charity can pursue goals that could not command a majority of voters. In this subpart I will build on some additional examples of instances in which charities can succeed while governments fail.

1. Crisis Spending

One key example where governments predictably fail is crisis spending. Private citizens should want to buy insurance or build up a buffer stock of savings against the possibility of bad times, such as natural disasters or recessions. But because of asymmetric information between individuals and insurers, markets for these kinds of insurance are over-priced, unavailable, or otherwise “incomplete,” which is a nice way of saying that they fail. Governments can and often should step in to provide fall-back social insurance, whether in the form of disaster insurance, unemployment insurance, or fiscal stimulus (that is, extra spending or tax cuts) during recessions. However, for a variety of reasons I have sketched in earlier work, government---especially state and local government---also performs poorly during recessions.

149 The readers should keep in mind as well that charitable pledges are legally enforceable contracts.

150 Galle, supra note 101, at 835--40.


152 Galle, supra note 101, at 823--24.

153 Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).

154 Id. at 4.

155 As with any insurance, government social insurance can give rise to bad incentives on the part of those who are insured, often called “moral hazard.” Good social insurance programs will include design features that balance the cost of moral hazard against the benefits of helping citizens deal with risk.

Historically, U.S. states have tended to cut spending and raise taxes during recessions, which is the exact opposite of what they should be doing. Federal relief arrives more consistently, but often at the wrong times and aimed at the wrong people.

Nonprofits can and should step in to fill this gap, but they face some practical obstacles in doing so. Donations to charity fall during recessions. Logically, donors are more likely to give when they have more available, and recessions can squeeze even the most generous. Wealthy individuals with no credit constraints, however, should be indifferent to current market fluctuations: they should anticipate that markets will rebound, and donate out of future wealth. That they seem not to fully do so tells us that the dip in giving may also be attributable to some other factor, such as tax policy.

Tax incentives for giving are also weaker during recessions. As current incomes fall, so do marginal tax rates, reducing the size of the government’s matching grant. Further, recall that a major tax advantage for donations of securities is that they allow the donor to deduct the full value of the security, without paying tax on the gains. During recessions, when the stock market is weaker, the securities held by potential donors are usually worth less, making both of these tax incentives less valuable.

Foundations might therefore serve as private piggy banks for the charity world. Governments would like to save for future crises, but struggle to do so in the face of political preferences for the present. Tax subsidies for foundations would be the equivalent of a government contract with private parties to save in government’s stead.

Even so, private foundation savings may not contribute much to the problem of crisis spending. Instead of paying for foundation savings, government could find ways of encouraging greater donations during times of need, as it did following Hurricane Katrina and other recent disasters. That would tend to reduce the need for charities to build up funds in anticipation of crises. On the other hand, it might be difficult for operating charities to absorb huge influxes of new funds over short periods. But that still doesn’t necessarily support foundation savings, since new funds would be hard to absorb whatever their source. It might be better if any savings

158 Id. at 2608. Danshera Cords provides a similar account of charitable efforts in relief of natural disasters. Charity Begins at Home? An Exploration of the Systemic Distortions Resulting from Post-Disaster Giving Incentives, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 213, 234--36 (2014).
159 Irvin, supra note 9, at 450.
161 Triantis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1146.
162 Bakija & Heim, supra note 160, at 619.
164 Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 12.
were done by the operating charities themselves, which might use excess funds during non-crisis times to build infrastructure and response capabilities.

Another difficulty with offering more generous subsidies for new donations in times of need is that donor responses to crises can also be somewhat inefficient, with gifts flowing to areas that get more press coverage, rather than those that may offer the greatest social benefit.\footnote{Cords, supra note 158, at 249.} On that front, at least, foundations can help by using more rigorous methods for directing funds.\footnote{Foundations might also be able to respond more quickly than individual donors. Triantis, supra note \textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, at 1147.}

Whatever the theoretical case for private foundation savings as a cure for crisis, in the real world private foundations don’t seem to pursue that goal. Foundation spending is flat or lower during recessions.\footnote{Irvin, supra note 9, at 450--51.} As a result, it is difficult to justify current foundation limited-spending policies on the basis that these policies allow for greater spending when economic need is greatest. In Part V, I discuss some possible ways in which a limited-spending rule could be reshaped to better fit with this goal.

\section*{2. A Federal Alternative}

A second instance where federated government often fails to produce a diverse array of policy choices for citizens is in the delivery of public goods whose benefits are spread relatively thinly across many different states.\footnote{Galle, supra note 101, at 822--25.} When benefits spill over in this way it is rational for each state and local government to aim to free ride on the efforts of others, and assembling an inter-jurisdictional special government entity to deal with the problem is costly and politically fraught.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 823.} As a result, the national government rarely has direct state competitors in important policy areas such as international aid, wildlife and natural resource conservation, basic science funding, and the like.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 810.} Charities offer the public an alternative to exclusive reliance on their national elected officials, and by providing competition or a yardstick for comparison can help to force those officials to perform better.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 822--23.}

We live in a big country, though, with big problems. The federal-alternative story may require similarly large stores of charitable resources. Perhaps to be effective at the regional or national level, the charitable sector must build a deep pool of funds.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 247 (arguing that perpetual foundations are better able to “stand up” to government because they can use “slow, steady pressure”); Marsh, supra note 16, at 169 (suggesting that foundations can “tackle large community projects” because they are able to “concentrate capital”).}
As with crisis spending, it isn’t clear that foundation savings are the best source of savings for this kind of future need. As national aggregator organizations such as the United Way show, the resources to achieve national influence need not come from one donor, whose seed money must then snowball over time. Put another way, the national-influence story doesn’t clearly establish whether any particular donation should be used for one large project or instead for a steady stream of small ones.

Further, operating charities, too, can build their resources to the point where they can be effective across a wide geographic area. Operating charities might also be perfectly effective if there are many small organizations that in the aggregate are able to get things done. That is largely the model of U.S. international aid organizations, and basic science similarly can be funded a handful of labs at time.173 Or national-influence service organizations could be funded with an ongoing, rolling stream of contributions from individual donors and moderate-sized foundations. On the other hand, having centralized funding to guide and evaluate new projects is likely important to their ultimate success.

Nor does the need for large organizations justify government support for gifts with indefinite or inflexible restricted-spending provisions. It may take time to build a firm to the point where it can meaningfully pursue nationwide projects. But at some point the firm reaches that scale. Under a restricted-spending rule, the time it takes the firm to achieve the appropriate scale for a national-level project is far longer: because the firm is bound to spending only a small fraction of its assets each year, it must wait until its assets grow to something like twenty times the annual spending it will need.174 In contrast, a firm that was free to spend, say, twenty percent of its assets in a year could launch its project far sooner.175 And a firm with national ambitions must be free to spend in large chunks at times when a opportunity to effect broad change arises.

C. A Review

Let’s step back for a moment to assess where the argument so far has taken us. As I’ve framed it, the basic question is whether subsidizing restricted-spending charity is a better use for the government’s resources than other alternatives. One alternative would be for the government to invest its money, and then later devote the resulting payoff to charity or some other

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173 See Jon Bennett, Introduction, in MEETING NEEDS: NGO COORDINATION IN PRACTICE ix, ix--xx (Jon Bennett ed. 2013) (summarizing studies of how NGOs deliver international aid).

174 Cf. FLEISHMAN, supra note 9, at 243 (explaining how spending limits postpone effective spending).

175 For example, suppose the foundation begins with a $10 million bequest and wants to be able to fund a $20 million project. Under a 5% payout limit, the foundation must have a $400 million endowment before it can spend that much. A firm that can spend up to 20% of its assets need only accumulate $100 million. How long will it take, assuming a 10% rate of return, to reach those numbers? The standard formula is $n = \frac{\log(FV) - \log(PV)}{\log(1+i)}$. Plugging our made-up values into this formula, it would take about 38.7 years to reach $400 million, but only 24.2 years to reach $100 million. The example simplifies the real world a bit, because foundations with limited payouts may be able to skip payout years and build up to a larger one-year expenditure. This would complicate our math, but the upshot---that the less-restricted firm could hit its target much sooner---would remain the same.
worthwhile project. Another would be to fund charities that will spend the subsidy relatively quickly.

While I cannot put precise numbers on any of the three options, the analysis so far suggests that restricted spending, except within certain limits, usually will have less value than either of the other options. For instance, compare restricted spending with government savings. Both government and foundations will likely earn similar investment returns. The problem is that the utility payoff from foundation spending diminishes over time, as the usefulness of each dollar declines with the expanding foundation sector, and agency and information costs eat away at the sector’s advantages. Or compare restricted spending charity with funding operating charities that will quickly spend the funds. Here, the unrestricted alternative’s advantages are that current programs generate learning externalities for present and future charity, and that a dollar spent now, when the world is needier, pays more than a dollar spent in the future.

As Part IV has shown, there are counter-arguments for restricted spending policies, but those arguments seem limited in scope. Foundations with a pool of assets can serve important roles, but those roles often demand flexibility to spend in times of great need or great opportunity. And, by fundraising, foundations can serve that role without the need for preserving the perpetual existence of any particular donor’s contribution. At best, the argument for restricted-spending subsidies would be an argument that foundations should not have to attract new donors, but if anything the opposite would seem to be true.

What, then, is to be done?

V. Policy Implications: Payout Rules and Beyond

Let’s now turn from theory to policy. So far my argument is that long-term restricted spending is socially costly, and at a minimum should probably not be subsidized. However, as I will explain in subpart V.A., simply eliminating existing federal subsidies for restricted-spending foundations is problematic. I’ll therefore consider a series of possible alternative approaches to at least mitigate the worst aspects of restricted spending in private foundations, and to shape restricted-spending policies to more closely resemble their theoretical justifications. In other words, in Parts V.B. through V.D., I work through ways to encourage foundations to spend money faster, and also to spend more intensively during times of greater need. Part V.E. will then move on to focus on restricted spending in a popular new substitute for private foundations, the so-called “donor advised fund.” Part V.F. looks at recently-adopted state laws that encourage restricted spending. I report for the first time evidence of the impact these laws have had on foundation policy---to preview, they have indeed reduced spending by some measures---and then make a case for their outright repeal.
A. Existing Subsidies Are Hard to Repeal

Part I. sketched the two main ways in which federal tax policy is currently underwriting restricted spending. First, donors receive a deduction at the time of their contribution to a foundation, irrespective of when the foundation spends that money. Second, the investment returns the foundation earns on that money are tax-free, so that it is tax-advantaged to have the foundation hold profitable assets over time.

While one approach to fixing the restricted spending problem would be to just repeal or greatly limit these tax advantages,176 full repeal seems impractical at least for the immediate deduction. For example, suppose that Congress were to defer a donor’s deduction or a portion of it until the donated funds were actually expended by the foundation.177 Because money is fungible, such a rule would not necessarily increase the amount of money actually appropriated each year by foundations, at least at organizations that borrow, have received multiple gifts, or have other sources of revenue.178 The Foundation might spend more of Bill Gates’ money now, but reduce the money it was spending out of its small-donor fund or its special-event revenues. Non-donative, non-investment revenues are empirically significant. For instance, in my sample, “other” income accounts for about four percent of total foundation inflows.179

Death, too, complicates any repeal plan. Repeal would put pressure on foundations to spend earlier so that donors can claim their deductions sooner. But once a taxpayer no longer has a stream of income against which to claim her deductions ---for instance, because she’s deceased---the foundation no longer would have any incentive to accelerate payouts. Delaying the deduction would also be complex to implement for bequests. Presumably, large estates would be denied a full deduction against the estate tax in the year of death,180 but then entitled to partial refunds over time as the bequest was spent down by the donee organization. This could entail burdensome record-keeping over many years, as well as potential legal uncertainty about how to divide the refunds among various heirs.

Rules applicable to new donations also would not affect any restricted-spending rules that now bind the nearly one trillion dollars in existing private foundation wealth.181 Deductions to organizations that do not pay out old wealth could be curtailed, but that would just encourage donors to form new foundations, leaving old money still subject to old rules.

While the administrative obstacles to taxing foundation investment earnings are not as substantial, there may be economic side-effects that make that option undesirable. Current law already imposes a small tax of one to two percent, as I will detail a bit more in Part IV.C., so

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176 See Brody, supra note 9, at 945 (noting this possibility).
177 See Gerzog, supra note 135, at 1180; Halperin, supra note 28, at [47]; Madoff, supra note 28, at 974.
178 See Halperin, supra note 28, at [26] (noting this problem with a rule requiring spending out of endowment).
179 See Table A.1., infra.
180 IRC § 2055.
181 See sources cited supra note 8.
there would be little direct administrative burden from simply increasing the rate. But it is far from clear that it would be optimal to impose the same tax on charitable investments as other businesses or individual investors face. A tax on foundation investment assets could encourage spending, but in some situations could also discourage it, and would introduce other changes in managers’ behavior as well. The optimal tax rate would represent a balance between these factors. In order to explain the tradeoffs fully, I will first have to explore some other legal rules that currently govern foundation payout, and so I will defer a complete discussion until Part IV.C. For now, it is enough to say that it is unlikely government would want to fully repeal foundations’ exemption for investment income.

**B. Section 4942: Federally-Required Payouts**

If outright repeal of foundations’ tax advantages are not attractive policy options, what other choices are there? One obvious option, which Congress already is employing to a limited extent, is to require that foundations loosen the knots of restricted spending rules. That is, Congress can set a payout rate, a minimum amount of annual spending for foundations each year. Under current law, foundations must annually spend at least five percent of the net investment assets they held at the end of the previous year. Qualifying expenditures include grant distributions to operating charities, as well as salary and other administrative costs. Foundations that can show they are saving up for a large future expenditure can get a temporary waiver of the spending requirement.

The payout rate should be much higher. When Congress adopted the current rule in 1981, its explanation was that five percent is the maximum sustainable payout. Foundation advocates presented Congress with the results of studies suggesting that the real rate of return on foundation assets averages about five percent. Any higher and foundation assets would tend to diminish over time, assuming no new contributions. I will now argue, though, that both these assumptions are flawed: real rates of return are much higher than five percent, and new contributions largely offset expenditures.

1. **New Data on Real Rates of Return**

Even accepting the premise that foundations should be able to sustain themselves indefinitely without attracting new donors, the best evidence actually demonstrates that average sustainable payouts rates are considerably higher than five percent. Since in my view prior studies all have significant flaws, I present new data drawn from a large sample of foundations.

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182 IRC § 4940. A potential complication, as Dan Halperin notes, is that if the tax were large enough Congress would likely have to also change some of the rules for taxes on unrelated business income. Halperin, supra note 24, at 306.
183 IRC § 4942(a), (e).
184 Id. § 4942(g)(1)(A).
185 Id. § 4942(g)(2).
186 Steuerle, supra note 210, at 424.
187 Id.
First, though, I should describe the prior studies and their problems. One early set of studies was built around simulations. The authors looked at some basic surveys of how foundations allocate their assets between stock and bonds. Using market average performance for those two categories, they computed the expected returns for typical foundation asset allocations. Most of these studies estimate real rates of return—that is, profits net of inflation—of between five and six percent.

Simulated data based on market averages don’t provide a good picture of real foundation returns. Other studies have found that some nonprofits can “dramatically outperform market indices,” and this result should not be surprising. For one, because foundations are tax-exempt and have a longer time horizon than most investors, they will be able to invest more aggressively than the average investor. Foundations have opportunities for tax arbitrage; to take the simplest example, a foundation can hold taxable bonds, rather than tax-exempts, and earn the higher rate of return that taxable bonds carry. Third, rational investors will not necessarily keep a fixed percentage of stock and bonds, but instead may change their portfolio allocation over time as market conditions change. And fourth, foundations may have investment opportunities and revenue sources other than stocks and bonds.

The more convincing studies look to the actual investment earnings reported by real foundations on their tax returns. In 1981, the Michigan Council on Foundations, a trade group that represents foundation interests, hired University of Michigan Business School to examine the historic investment returns at a handful of Michigan foundations. Since then, the study was turned over to Cambridge Associates, Inc. (“CAI”), a financial consultant, which produced updates in 2000, 2004, and 2013. Each time, CAI has concluded that “Data from the actual

188 DEMARCHE ASSOCIATES, INC., PAYOUT POLICIES AND INVESTMENT PLANNING FOR FOUNDATIONS: A STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINING A FOUNDATION’S ASSET MIX (1990); Salamon, supra note 1, at 119, summarizes several other early simulation results.
189 However, an IRS simulation for the years 1979 to 1982 projected a rate of 8.5%, and that number did not even include unrealized appreciation. Margaret Riley, Internal Revenue Service, Private Foundation Information Returns 7 (1985), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/82pfinforeturns.pdf.
191 Taxable investors are more reluctant to shift investments because selling most assets triggers tax on any investment gains in that asset. Therefore, we should expect nonprofits to be able to more actively churn their portfolio. Halperin, supra note 24, at 309. At the same time, because of its long time horizon, the foundation typically has the luxury of holding relatively illiquid assets, which can provide for a greater return. See Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers Part II: The Performance, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 239, 244 (1993) (reporting that “[f]oundations with longer time horizons tended to perform better”).
193 For a formal model, see Isabelle Bajeux-Besnaïou & Kurtay Ogunc, Spending Rules for Endowment Funds, 27 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. ACCOUNTING 93, 104 (2006).
194 See infra Table A.1.
experience from … a group of Michigan foundations with diversified portfolios do not support a payout rate higher than 5%.”

Among other difficulties with the CAI study is that it examines not a random sample of foundations, but instead a group of foundations that apparently voluntarily agreed to participate.198 Most of the participating entities, furthermore, were in Michigan.199 We might expect that a foundation that agrees to open its books to close scrutiny by outsiders might be atypical in some ways. For example, if foundations with good or bad results were more likely to be included in the sample group, that could produce results that are not representative of the foundation population as a whole. In any event, given the small size of the study---fewer than 50 firms---its results may be unrepresentative simply by random chance.

The nonprofit scholar Lester Salamon took a more convincing approach.200 Salamon drew a random sample of more than 1,000 foundation tax returns, sent them a mail survey, and then examined more closely the 350 or so that responded. Once more, we don’t know whether the firms that responded were representative of the sector as a whole, but at least Salamon was looking at about seven times as many firms. On the other hand, he was only able to study seven years of data, from 1979 to 1986. Over that stretch, Salamon reports that “[a]fter adjusting for inflation, the rate of return on foundation assets was close to 11 percent a year.”

In an attempt to get a truly representative picture of foundation performance, I replicate the CAI methodology in a large, randomized sample of private foundations with twenty-five years of data. Again, I detail the construction of the sample and my calculations in the Appendix.

I find an average compound return a bit higher than the CAI results. The mean rate of return is 12.69%. The weighted median is 8.52%.202 These returns are good but not extraordinary; many simple investment portfolios could have achieved returns in excess of 11% over the same period.

Obviously, this number is much higher than the five-percent figure estimated by CAI. In fact, though, the nominal rates of return I find---that is, the returns before inflation---are quite

197 Id. at 1--3.
199 Id. at 23. CAI’s 2013 update reportedly adds “data from a national aggregate of private foundations obtained from the IRS,” without detailing the methodology for that analysis. Cambridge Associates, Update, supra note 196, at 4. A footnote to the update appears to imply that the report relied on IRS aggregate data, id. at 4 n.3, suggesting that the report does not winsorize to exclude extreme outliers.
200 Salamon, supra note 191, at 241.
201 Id. at 243. An IRS study of one year of data also found returns of 12.4%. Margaret Riley, Private Foundation Returns 1985, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI BULLETIN SUMMER 1989, at 27, 31. In a summary table, Yoder and McAllister report mean net investment income, exclusive of asset appreciation, of 9.9% for the period 1995 through 2007. Yoder & McAllister, supra note 79, at 58 Tbl.2.
202 The unweighted but winsorized mean is 8.11%, with a median of 6.87%.
close to the CAI figures. For example, CAI’s 2000 report finds nominal rates of between 11.06 and 12.48. CAI apparently reaches its much lower figure by discounting their nominal returns by a rate of inflation of between five and six percent.

To provide a full apples-to-apples comparison, I also attempt to estimate a real (i.e., net of inflation) rate of return. I cannot be certain that I am fully replicating CAI’s method, however, because does CAI not disclose how they calculated their inflation rate, except to state that their figure relies on the “CPI deflator.”

I emphasize the choice of inflation methods because the average inflation rates in my data are much lower than the five to six percent range CAI assumes in its 2000 report. Depending on which measure of inflation I employ, I get an average inflation rate of between 2.5 and 3.3%. Readers interested in inflation measures can find more detail in the Appendix.

After accounting for inflation, firms still achieve an average rate of return of between 9.34% and 10.11%. The median real compound return is 4.84% to 5.65%. Table One summarizes the results.

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<th>Table One: Real Rates of Return at a Sample of Private Foundations Using Three Different Measures of Inflation, 1985 to 2013</th>
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Notes: Source: IRS PF-SOI 2011 Cumulative File. Number of firms: 21,486. Data are winsorized and weighted by average firm assets.

In short, I find that even when accounting for inflation, we should expect that the average dollar invested in a private foundation will earn a return of at least nine percent. That number, of course, is considerably higher than the current five percent minimum payout required under federal law. The five percent figure was defended, historically, as the maximum that foundations could spend and still be able to sustain their endowment. My results suggest that sustainable spending could exceed five percent by a considerable margin.

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204 Cambridge Associates, Inc., supra note 195, at 7, 25. The 2013 update claims that both Michigan and “national” nominal returns are lower, at about 9.5%. Cambridge Associates, Update, supra note 196, at 4. Notably, the data for the update end in 2009, which of course was an historically poor year for investment assets.


206 Cambridge Associates, supra note 195, at 25. I submitted a working draft of this paper to CAI for their comment, but they did not respond, despite initially indicating that they would do so.

207 The 2013 Update appears to apply an inflation discount of about 3%. Cambridge Associates, Update, supra note 196, at 4.
It might be argued that, while the mean rates of return are substantial, median rates fall around the traditional five percent figure. About half of foundations, mostly quite small ones, cannot sustainably spend five percent.

I would argue in response that the mean returns are much more important for policy purposes. For one, we’ve seen that most of the arguments for restricted spending apply to the foundation sector as a whole, not any given firm. The mean rate of return is the number that would preserve the total amount of funds available across all firms and time periods. Secondly, even if a minimum payout set at the mean rate would eventually cause under-performing firms to spend down their assets (assuming no new contributions), that is the right result. If Congress can invest public money in two alternate savings vehicles, one paying five percent and the other ten, why would it want to leave its funds in the firm that can only manage a five percent return? To the extent that there is value in perpetual life for a particular firm, we’ve seen that that value likely only holds for large and venerable organizations, not the small and perhaps neglected foundations that largely comprise the group earning sub-median returns.208

In any event, even if there were good policy reasons to protect the perpetuity of small under-performing foundations, that would not be a reason to set the same minimum payout rate for larger and more successful ones. There is no obvious reason Congress must set the same minimum payout rate for all foundations. Minimum payout rates could be determined by the amount of foundation assets---for instance, by having the minimum rate scale up as assets increase---or set individually for each firm by using a rolling average of past investment performance.209

2. New Data on Growth in Overall Foundation Assets

As I argued in Part III., standard finance theory suggests that foundations should be willing to spend out of future expected contributions as well as present wealth. Therefore, I also examine the combined effect of investment returns and new contributions on foundation assets. I follow the same methodology as in Part V.B.1., except that the formula for change in assets does not subtract out new contributions. Table Two summarizes the results.

| Table Two: Average Private Foundation Investment Returns Plus New Contributions |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|                                | Growth Rate Per Firm, Real Dollars | Nominal Growth Rate Per Firm Over Nominal U.S. GDP |
| Mean                           | 18.17%                            | 2.72                               |
| Median                         | 8.13%                             | 1.61                               |

209 On the latter point, see Deep & Frumkin, supra note 9, at 20.

As Table Two shows, the combination of investments and donations would allow foundations to grow at more than eighteen percent a year on average. I also find that foundation assets grow considerably faster than the economy: The median firm grew more than 60% faster than the U.S. economy.210

Because I measure only within-foundation changes, these data might either over- or understate assets available to the foundation section as a whole, as foundations may close or new foundations may appear. Survey data from the Foundation Center report that the number of foundations grew from sixty-four thousand to eight-six thousand between 2002 and 2012, and that new gifts to foundations have been roughly equal to total foundation grants paid in about half the years over that period.211 That is, in half of the years in the last decade the foundation sector has on net not spent any of the investment return on its assets. Similarly, in my sample, the mean value for the excess of expenditures over donations, as a share of foundation investment assets, is negative but very close to zero.212 Foundation Center data show that foundations have grown by more than 5 percent annually, net of expenditures, implying that there is room for considerably greater spending.213

3. Summary and Caveats

I believe these data make a strong case that, even assuming foundations should do nothing but spend an equal amount of money every year in perpetuity, the amount the law could demand they spend should be much higher than the present five percent. Admittedly, however, there might be some offsetting costs to higher spending rates. We do not presently know how donors would respond to an increased payout requirement. If donors view payout rates as burdensome, they might shift to giving directly to operating charities, and it is also possible that overall contributions to charity could fall. This effect could be offset if managers are concerned about falling asset balances and work harder to bring in new donations. If managers dislike high payout rates or fundraising, however, they might demand greater compensation. There is some

210 I include share of GDP because, as Gene Steuerle argues, “[t]he absolute size of the foundation sector may not be so important as its size relative to national wealth.” Eugene Steuerle, Distribution Requirements for Foundation, 30 NAT’L TAX J. 423, 428 (1977). I compare each firm’s growth rate to the growth in GDP over the period we have data for that firm. This explains why the ratio for mean GDP ratio is not more than double the ratio for median GDP ratio: the GDP growth rate is different for the mean and median firm.


212 The exact mean is .006, six-tenths of a percent.

existing evidence that managers at faster-paying firms earn a bit more, and I find a similar trend in my data, as Table Four below reports. This latter cost is a modest portion of foundation resources, however.

More problematically, if managers view payouts as in effect a tax, they might be less willing to exert effort at earning a high return on foundation assets. There is some evidence that pre-1981 law, which imposed in effect a 100% payout requirement on foundation earnings above five percent, somewhat depressed foundation investment performance. But reforms to increase payouts to something like ten or fifteen percent would be a much less draconian burden than 100%, so it is hard to know whether the pre-1981 scenario would return under my proposals. More empirical work on these questions would be useful going forward.

C. Section 4940: Federal Tax on Net Investment Earnings

In addition to requiring a minimum payout of foundation net assets, Congress also imposes a small tax on net foundation investment earnings ("NIE"). Ordinarily, the tax rate is two percent, but an organization can cut that to one percent if its annual payout share exceeds its average over the previous five-year period. Given this low rate, and the fact that net earnings are only a fraction of the value of the foundation’s total investments, the total amount of tax is tiny compared to the payout requirement. In my data, the mean tax payment is just $35,000, or about one-tenth of a percent of the average firm’s investment assets.

In theory, a tax on foundation investment income could spur increased grant-making. Like a carbon tax, the foundation tax would be a “Pigouvian” tax, or a penalty on a behavior that has undesirable effects for others. By reducing the payoff to investing, the tax would make investing less attractive for managers, relative to other options—in economics lingo, this is the “substitution” effect of the tax. So managers would be more inclined to spend, although potentially some of that spending might be on their own salary and perks rather than grant awards.

But taxes also could affect foundations in other ways. Right now, foundations can aggressively switch between investments without worrying that sale of the underperforming asset will trigger a tax on the appreciated gains. Making them taxable would undermine this

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214 Sansing & Yetman, supra note 208, at 365, also find a significant correlation between payout rates and compensation.
215 Salamon, supra note 191, at 243–44. Salamon notes that overall market conditions were also changing during this period, making causation difficult to pin down. Id.
216 T.C. § 4940.
217 For a cogent summary of the intricacies of the tax, see Yoder & McAllister, supra note 79, at 49.
218 See infra Table A.1.
220 GRUBER, supra note 58, at 36; see Halperin, supra note 28, at [39], [44] (proposing this rationale for a tax on investment income).
221 Halperin, supra note 24, at 305–06.
222 Id. at 309.
advantage. Lower returns on investment could also reduce managers’ incentives to put time and resources into asset management, although it also could spur fundraising to make up for the lost dollars. And donors, knowing that their contributions will earn lower returns overall, might give less. So even if the foundations actually pay little in tax, the behavioral side-effects of its imposition could reduce the resources available for charity. Professor Halperin proposes a tax on total assets, rather than earnings, which could eliminate the first problem but likely not the others.

More problematic still, an NIE tax could actually diminish managers’ desire to spend. An economist would say that there is an undesirable “income effect” that contends with the substitution effect we want to produce. For example, suppose that in order to maintain the foundation in perpetuity and protect their jobs, managers prefer to spend investment earnings, and will not spend any money directly out of endowment. By reducing the net earnings of the foundation, the tax would reduce the amount these managers would be willing to spend.

On the other hand, a minimum payout rule, in combination with a higher tax, might soften the blow of the income effect. Perhaps the relative influence of the income and substitution effects varies across firms. The worry would be that the drop in spending due to the income effect at some firms would outweigh the substitution-driven increase at others. A minimum payout would help to tip the balance towards greater spending, by constraining firms that would otherwise be inclined to cut their expenditures. But this would certainly not be a perfect solution.

This might be a situation where carrots, not sticks, offer a better solution. If Congress could offer higher after-tax investment returns to foundations that pay out more generously, that would flip some of the unwanted side-effects of an investment tax. An investment bonus for payouts would still create substitution effects in favor of spending, but would also realign income effects to point in the right direction. Since it would be, in effect, a matching grant for foundation investments, it might also encourage donors to give more, and managers to work harder.

Current law somewhat approximates this goal, but clumsily. Again, by exceeding their five-year historical average payout, foundations can trim their tax from two to one percent. One problem with this approach is that, as others note, it sometimes gives firms the wrong incentive, since increased payouts in any year will require even higher payouts in the future in order to

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223 Id. at 301; for evidence, see Heutel & Zeckhauser, supra note 190, at 43.
224 Halperin, supra note 28, at [46].
225 Gruber, supra note 58, at 36; see Halperin, supra note 24, at 305.
226 One suggestive piece of evidence on this front is that foundations’ shift to higher-return investment strategies followed closely the 1981 reduction of mandatory payout rates. Salamon, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 128.
228 Id. at 832.
secure the one-percent rate.\textsuperscript{229} My colleague Ray Madoff has recently proposed a simplified version that eliminates this problem.\textsuperscript{230} More generally, though, it is unclear that a one-percent carrot is enough of an incentive: the right bonus could be five percent, or ten.\textsuperscript{231}

All of this is to say that the optimal rate of tax on foundation investments depends on a set of tradeoffs. Since we don’t yet have good data on how firms would respond to a significant tax, the correct rate is unclear, and might well be negative --- that is, the best policy might be a subsidy, not a tax at all.

What we do know is that foundations with living donors behave quite differently than firms whose founders are long gone: foundations with deceased donors are much more likely to distribute only the statutory minimum.\textsuperscript{232} Potentially, the ideal policy would impose different rates of tax, or offer different rates of subsidy, depending on these kinds of basic firm demographics. For instance, for “old and cold” foundations that are unable to attract new donations, and whose spending has been persistently bumping along at the statutory minimum, a tax might make more sense than a subsidy, since the minimum distribution rule already is preventing untoward income effects.

\textbf{D. Countercyclical Payouts}

In Part IV.B., I argued that restricted spending can be justified to the extent that foundations play a role in fighting recessions and disasters. We saw empirically that does not actually happen. One likely reason, as others have observed, is that current tax law actually discourages recession-fighting, or “countercyclical,” foundation spending.\textsuperscript{233} Because the minimum payout rule depends on the value of the foundation’s assets in the prior tax year, and assets tend to decline in value during economic slowdowns, existing law weakens any incentive for firms to spend during hard times. Managers’ job-security concerns may be especially acute during recessions, compounding the problem. As we saw earlier, a similar tax flaw is that the incentives for new contributions to philanthropic organizations also decline during recessions, due to the diminishing worth of the charitable contribution deduction during those periods.\textsuperscript{234}

Prior proposals to fix these problems are too milquetoast. The main suggestion, which is sensible, is to calculate the minimum payout floor based on a multi-year, rolling average of the firm’s assets, instead of just one year at a time.\textsuperscript{235} That way, at the beginning of recessions, the average will include some good years as well as the more recent bad ones.\textsuperscript{236} But this idea just

\textsuperscript{229} Sansing & Yetman, \textit{supra} note 208, at 367; Yoder & McAllister, \textit{supra} note 79, at 46--47.
\textsuperscript{231} The one-percent cut is a carrot because it enriches firms relative to the existing 2% baseline. Galle, \textit{supra} note 227, at 804.
\textsuperscript{232} Salamon, \textit{supra} note 191, at 248--50; Sansing & Yetman, \textit{supra} note 208, at 365; Yoder & McAllister, \textit{supra} note 79, at 47.
\textsuperscript{233} Fremont-Smith, \textit{supra} note 108, at 2.
\textsuperscript{234} Steuerle, \textit{supra} note 210, at 425.
\textsuperscript{235} Salamon, \textit{supra} note 191, at 251; Steuerle, \textit{supra} note 210, at 426.
\textsuperscript{236} Id.
doesn’t go far enough. Using my sample of foundations, I ran simulations in which I calculated how much a three-year inflation-adjusted rolling average would boost spending during recession years. Inflation adjustment is important; without it, spending increases only 5.5%.

In any event, rolling averages would also have the unwanted side-effect of depressing spending in the period just after recessions, since the post-recession average would be weighed down by the recessionary asset values. State and local budgets usually lag recessions somewhat. The period of greatest fiscal stress for those governments---and therefore the time of greatest need for charitable supplements---would be just when rolling averages would be pushing down foundation spending.

It would be more effective, and more consistent with the best rationales for restricted spending, to raise the minimum spending floor during recessions. For example, a simulation of a temporary two-percent increase in the payout floor, to seven percent during recessions, predicts a 26% increase in recession spending.

To be sure, we should consider carrots for countercyclical spending alongside or instead of the minimum-payout stick. For instance, to make up for shortfalls in donations, Congress and state governments could offer more generous tax subsidies during times of need, as Congress has occasionally done before.

A more dramatic approach would be to add a bonus deduction, perhaps even refundable, for donations that are earmarked for immediate spending during recessions. That would accomplish several recession-fighting goals at once: it would lower taxes, put more people to work, and provide more safety-net spending. It is possible that the bonus would only change the timing of some planned gifts, rather than increasing donations overall. That, though, would also be socially useful, since the payoff to the government’s subsidy dollar is higher during recessions.

A parallel policy aimed at foundation managers could be to offer bonus credit against future 4942 requirements or 4940 liability. That is, if a foundation spends a dollar above the five-percent floor during a recession, it would be able to reduce the amount it must distribute after the recession ends by, say, $1.20 or $1.50. Again, the effect of this incentive would mostly

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237 For simplicity, I assume that all firms actually meet or exceed their minimum-spending threshold.
239 To simplify, I assume the simulated policy would not affect the foundation’s assets except through the spending rule.
240 See supra note 163.
241 See Bakija, supra note 119, at 573 (suggesting that some donor response to variations in tax incentives may be pure re-timing).
be to shift the timing of foundation spending, but that is exactly what governments should do: they should move public money from flush times to hard times. My own view is that this option is hard to square with the goals of restricted spending, since it would tend to reduce foundation spending rates overall. I offer it for those who disagree with me about the value of restricted spending, but would nonetheless like to see foundations act more countercyclically.

Finally, foundations could be encouraged to issue more loans or loan guarantees. Service organizations report that donations and local government contracts dry up during recessions. As we saw earlier, a firm without credit constraints would borrow to smooth revenues over these tougher periods, especially given the higher marginal returns to its output---i.e., the greater social need---during those times. Foundations could step in to help service organizations fill this borrowing need.

Current law already offers very mild incentives in this direction, allowing foundations to count below-market loans to service providers against their 4942 limit. In my sample, though, foundations hardly use this option at all; barely one-tenth of one percent of foundation assets is given over to these “program-related investments.”

More generous treatment---such as offering bonuses against later 4942 obligations, allowing foundations to earn higher rates of return, or booking loan guarantees as current expenditures---might help to stimulate more loans. Even a simple informational campaign could help foundations to recognize the important role that more aggressive use of loans and guarantees could serve.

All of these policies would work better if they were automatically triggered. Timing is crucial for recession-fighting policy. Waiting for Congress to get around to enacting a temporary fix rarely works out well, as our experiences with the 2009 stimulus bill illustrated. A well-designed statute would trigger whenever economic conditions hit certain thresholds, such as employment rates that dipped a substantial amount below historical trends.

E. Closing Donor Advised Fund Loopholes

I mentioned earlier that the last decade has seen a dramatic rise of donor advised funds (“DAFs”), an alternative to private foundations. Because of their novelty, DAFs remain exempt from many of the rules that govern private foundations---and indeed, DAF organizers attribute

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242 If donors view spending floors as a tax, there might also be increased donations via the income effect.
244 IRC § 4944(c); see David A. Levitt & Robert A. Wexler, Proposed Regulations Would Bring Program-Related Investments Into the 21st Century, J. TAX., Aug. 2012, at 100, 103.
245 See infra Table A.1.
248 Strnad, supra note 246, at 180.
much of the institution’s popularity to this freedom. In the long run, it will do little good to reform the rules of private foundation spending if new donors can use donor advised funds to avoid the new rules.

Most critically, DAFs are not subject to any minimum payout requirement. Contributors to a qualified DAF can claim a full charitable contribution deduction at the date of transfer, even if the fund itself never distributes any money. Further, because the organizations that sponsor DAFs are usually treated as public charities for tax purposes, donors get an even more generous tax subsidy than is usually available to private foundation contributors.

DAF defenders suggest that no minimum payout rule is needed, because they claim that as a descriptive matter payouts from DAFs have been relatively rapid. This is not necessarily true, and also proves less than the defenders think. The IRS does not currently require DAF sponsors to report DAF payouts on a fund-by-fund basis. Therefore sponsors such as Fidelity are able to report aggregate statistics. Judging by these aggregates, DAF payout rates are respectable, averaging about 16% of the funds under management annually. But we have no way of knowing whether this could represent a few funds that pay out all their money, together with many funds that pay little or nothing. Further, because DAFs are so new, we don’t know what DAF payout rates will look like when the funds are mature, especially after the death of the donor. In the private foundation data, old firms, especially those whose original donors have passed on, spend much lower shares of their assets than others.

It might also be argued that DAFs raise fewer concerns about agency costs than foundations. In theory, all the spending decisions of the DAF are made by the contributors, mitigating the problem that managers will make decisions the donors wouldn’t. The DAF agency problem is more subtle, though. DAF sponsors make money by claiming a yearly management fee, usually a percentage point or two of the assets in the fund. The sponsors therefore have an incentive to discourage distributions. DAF sponsors have been wonderfully innovative in crafting ways to make it easy to get money into a DAF, but we haven’t seen similar innovations in tools for spending the money. Neither of these facts is surprising, given the way that the DAF sponsors are compensated.

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249 Marsh, supra note 16, at 147.
251 Marsh, supra note 16, at 147.
253 Id. at 5, 50.
255 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 252, at 59.
256 Sansing & Yetman, supra note 208, at 378–79.
257 Marsh, supra note 16, at 147, 178.
258 See Marsh, supra note 16, at 175–76 (describing bare-bones donation forms employed by DAFs); U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 252, at 50 (noting evidence of low advisory effort by national DAF sponsors).
F. State Law

Finally, the federal government is not the only charity regulator. State organizational law provides default rules for the rights and obligations that nonprofit stakeholders share. Notably, state law provides background principles for how nonprofit managers will invest and spend the organization’s funds. In 2006 and the years following, many states undertook dramatic revision to the investment rules, as they adopted a model act known as the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, or UPMIFA.

A little-noticed provision of UPMIFA could have considerable impact on foundation spending. UPMIFA’s drafters included an optional provision (modeled on a longstanding Massachusetts rule) allowing adopting states to create a soft cap on endowment spending for corporate charities (but not, for the most part, charitable trusts). The cap states that annual spending in excess of seven percent of a firm’s investment assets would be presumptively a violation of the manager’s duty to the organization, although the presumption is rebuttable. Thirteen states have adopted some version of the cap, although Ohio’s differs from all the others.

My empirical analysis shows that the cap has had an impact on foundation spending. Table Four reports the results of a regression analysis comparing firms in UPMIFA-adopting states before and after the adoption of the spending cap. I first examine the effect of changes in law within firms over time, comparing firms where the cap took effect against other firms in the same state that are not governed by UPMIFA—a so-called “difference in differences” analysis. The imposition of a cap seems to reduce average spending in newly-capped firms by about eight percent, and reduces the likelihood that the firm will exceed the federal floor by seven percent. In another analysis, detailed in the Appendix, I also find that, comparing firms subject to a cap to similar firms in uncapped states, capped firms are 30% less likely to exceed the 5% federal spending floor.

259 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 44, at 304–06.
260 Gary, supra note 23, at 1288–89.
261 Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act § 4 (Committee Note).
262 Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act § 4(d).

Ohio sets the cap at five percent, and flips the presumption, stating that spending under five percent is presumptively prudent.
Table Three: Effect of Default Spending Cap on Foundation Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Does Firm Pay Over Five Percent Floor?</th>
<th>Log of Grants Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year subject to cap</td>
<td>-0.0710***</td>
<td>-0.0836***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.971)</td>
<td>(-5.938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log officer compensation</td>
<td>0.0611***</td>
<td>0.0949***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.348)</td>
<td>(3.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: coefficients reported with (z-score). Regressions include controls for foundation net assets, donations received, officer compensation, income, and negative income; state expenditures, population, and share of population under 26 and over 64; and state, firm, and calendar-year fixed effects. Number of firms: 7,477. ***: statistically significant at the 1% level.

The policy recommendation here is simple. There is no obvious policy justification for the spending cap, and it is reducing the money available for current charitable needs. States should repeal their caps. Further, some states have adopted tax incentives to lure restricted-spending vehicles away from other states. Others should resist this kind of destructive race to the bottom, and federal rules disfavoring restricted spending might help in that direction.

Conclusion

Choosing exactly the right regulations for restricted spending charities won’t necessarily be easy or obvious, but we probably know enough today to take some first steps. The arguments in favor of subsidizing charitable gifts subject to restricted spending are surprisingly thin. Future philanthropy is often predictably of lower value than charity today. To the extent that waiting has value, that goal can be met through policies other than perpetually restricted spending: organizations can raise new money, and government policy can encourage organizations to set aside money temporarily to distribute in a later crisis.

The real question, then, is how best to reconcile the unappealing nature of restricted spending with the welter of current laws that support and encourage it. To be sure, any policy change could have unwanted side effects. If we demand that donors allow their gifts to be spent more quickly, there is some potential that donors or managers could change their behaviors in response. But there is no evidence right now to suggest that this effect would be a major factor. There is, on the other hand, considerable evidence—including new data I have reported here—that foundations could continue indefinitely even under much higher rates of spending than the

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264 The Reporter for the committee that drafted the Act stated that the cap provision was included out of “[c]oncern that charities would be tempted to spend endowments assets too rapidly.” Gary, supra note 23, at 1314.

265 Irvin, supra note 9, at 454.
law now requires. Further, there seem to be no worries about side-effects from revoking several of the more egregious, and unjustified, rules propping up restricted spending, such as the non-regulation of donor advised funds, and state laws that seem to have no purpose other than a race to the bottom to entice foundation-lawyering business from state to state.

In sum, while caution is appropriate, this is an area where some of the fruit are hanging low indeed. Policy makers should consider some first steps now, and researchers can study whether these steps give any indication that more dramatic action to curb restricted spending would have unwanted impact.

Appendix

The foundation data used throughout this Article are derived from the 2011 Cumulative PF-SOI data file compiled by the National Center on Charitable Statistics. NCCS collates data from individual Form 990 tax returns filed by each foundation and then machine-scanned by the IRS. The Cumulative file includes tax returns for fiscal years spanning 1985 through 2011. Not all organizations are included in the PF-SOI data; instead, the data are a stratified sample, with over-weighting of the largest firms. Unless otherwise noted, I use sample weighting to recover the population distribution.

Except where noted, I deflate nominal values to real dollar amounts using the PCE index calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table A.1. provides a statistical overview of the data; data reported in this table are not winsorized but are sample weighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>386773</td>
<td>1.66E+07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.40E+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>498220.9</td>
<td>9426910</td>
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<td>3.77E+09</td>
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<td>6170387</td>
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<td>3.91E+10</td>
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<td>Taxable Trust?</td>
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<td>0.018572</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Foundation?</td>
<td>0.080528</td>
<td>0.27211</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4942 Expends</td>
<td>477772.4</td>
<td>9200223</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.77E+09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>33831.49</td>
<td>1271622</td>
<td>-3.54E+08</td>
<td>4.14E+08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>848706.7</td>
<td>2.10E+07</td>
<td>-4.63E+08</td>
<td>1.39E+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Comp</td>
<td>10850.59</td>
<td>81551.72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9371595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants Paid</td>
<td>415127.2</td>
<td>1.05E+07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.16E+09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Expends</td>
<td>534889.7</td>
<td>1.17E+07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.72E+09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities</td>
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<td>1.49E+07</td>
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<td>1.29E+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payout / Inv. Assets</td>
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<td>69.13112</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18773.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Investment Assets</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3.55E+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPMIFA in Effect</td>
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<td>0.374953</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prog. Related Inv. ($)</td>
<td>34342</td>
<td>821275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.68E+08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: Number of Observations: 228407. All dollar figures deflated to 2009 dollars using the PCE deflator.

**Foundation Returns on Investment**

Part V.B.1. describes the historical rate of return on foundation investments. For the most part, I replicate the methodology of CAI, which has prepared a series of prior reports, but I use my full sample of thousands of foundations, rather than CAI’s four dozen. I omit private operating foundations and nonexempt charitable trusts.

To calculate the average compounded rate of return, I follow the method for imputing investment returns provided in the 2000 CAI report Appendix D. That is, the imputed annual rate of return, before inflation, is:

\[
\frac{\text{net investment assets}_t - \text{net investment assets}_{t-1} + \text{expenditures}_t + \text{taxes paid}_t - \text{new contributions}_t}{\text{net investment assets}_{t-1}}
\]

where the subscripts \( t \) and \( t-1 \) indicate that values are for the current fiscal year and the antecedent year, respectively.\(^{266}\) In order to translate these figures into a compounded rate of return, I link the individual annual observations in a geometric sequence and compute an annual rate of return using the standard compound growth rate formula.

As typically occurs with large financial databases, the resulting values include some extreme outliers. A standard research practice in this context is to “winsorize” the data, which is to drop observations falling in the highest and lowest percentile of results.\(^{267}\) Hand examination of samples of the dropped observations suggests that many seem to have been carelessly reported or inaccurately scanned, with implausible values for key inputs into the formula.\(^{268}\) Again following the methodology of the CAI report, I also weight the results by firm assets.

I calculate real rates of return using three measures of inflation. The U.S. Government uses different measures of inflation for different purposes. Three of the major measures are CPI, PCE, and the GDP deflator.\(^{269}\) Each measure varies somewhat from the others in which goods are included in the “basket” whose price is observed, the method of estimating consumer prices, and the statistical techniques used to measure changes.\(^{269}\)

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\(^{266}\) The CAI study is unclear on whether it uses current or antecedent year values for expenditures, taxes, and new contributions. Logically, since the value we are reconstructing is the change in asset values between the end of year zero and the end of year one, these should be year one values.


\(^{268}\) For example, NCCS attempts to flag and correct returns for which some values are reported in dollars and others in thousands of dollars, but they do not claim, and likely could not realistically achieve, complete success in that effort.

responses, and similar technical details. CPI itself has two variants, standard and “chained” CPI. Chained CPI and PCE each assume that, as prices rise, consumers will switch to cheaper alternatives, while standard CPI assumes (probably unrealistically) a fixed basket of goods. PCE is probably the best measure of the inflation rate facing foundations, since it is chained and its basket explicitly is modeled to include items commonly purchased by service-providing nonprofits, while CPI tracks only goods bought by consumers.

In any event, I calculate real rates of return separately for CPI, PCE and GDP deflator. I allow each firm to face an individualized inflation rate by comparing monthly inflation rates for the last month of the firm’s fiscal year in the first year the firm appears in the SOI file against the monthly CPI-U for the last month the firm appears.

Recessionary Spending Simulation

Part V.D. reports the simulated effect on recessionary spending of a policy in which firms use an inflation-adjusted three-year average of their minimum-payout floor. Recessions dates are derived from NBER determinations. I code a year as recessionary if the economy was contracting for more than one month of that year. To run the simulation, I assume that any firm that met its minimum payout rate in reality would also meet any increased payout triggered by the use of a three-year average; this assumption may slightly overstate the real impact of a higher floor. For simplicity, I assume that changing the floor does not affect firms whose spending exceeded the simulated floor amount or those that missed their real minimum.

After winsorizing and weighting by firm mean assets, I find that mean spending during recessions was $7.63 million, while simulated spending using the three-year average would rise to $8.49 million, an increase of 11.3%. If averaging is done with nominal rather than inflation-adjusted floor amounts, spending would increase only 5.5%. In contrast, a simulation of a seven-percent floor increases mean recession spending to $9.62 million, a 26.1% increase.

Effect of Default Spending Caps

Part V.F. describes the results of regression analyses in which I examine the impact of a state-law default presumption of imprudence for firms spending in excess of seven percent of their net investment assets. To control for the effects of other reforms that might affect spending, I limit the analysis to states that enact UPMIFA, a 2006 model act adopted by forty-six states between 2006 and 2011. UPMIFA includes an optional provision imposing the seven-percent cap, and thirteen states either adopt the model provision or already had one in place as of the date

270 Id. at 28--30.
272 Bully et al., supra note 269, at 28.
273 Id. at 29.
274 Because historical GDP deflator data are only available quarterly, I use the quarter closest to the close of the firm’s fiscal year in place of the actual month.
275 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
276 I therefore code 2007 as non-recessionary, since the economy was contracting only in December of that year.
UPMIFA went into effect. Data on UPMIFA adoption date and cap adoption were hand-collected and coded. Because Ohio’s cap rule is dissimilar from all other states, I omit Ohio from the analysis. My results aren’t meaningfully affected by dropping Ohio.

I estimate the impact of the cap three different ways. The first two employ fixed-effects panel regressions, with the dependent variable either logged grants awarded or the share of firms distributing qualifying funds in excess of their federal five-percent floor. In both cases, I use a difference-in-differences identification strategy. UPMIFA governs the behavior of nonprofits organized as corporations, but not those organized as trusts. The reported coefficient measures the interaction effect of dummy variables for corporate status and post-cap-enactment time period, as in equation 2, below:

\[ S_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Cap_{jt} + \beta_2 Corp_{i} + \delta Cap_{jt} \times Corp_{i} + \beta_3 X_{it} + \lambda t + \gamma i + \phi j + \varepsilon \] (2)

where \( \delta \) is the coefficient of interest, the interaction term between cap enactment and the “treated” population, \( j \) and \( i \) index states and firms, respectively, and \( X \) is a vector of firm-level controls. Because the treatment effect varies only at the state level, I cluster standard errors by state.

To capture some sense of the cross-sectional variation, the third approach uses a pooled probit model, again identifying off of the difference in differences. I then estimate the marginal effect of the cap provision at sample means using the margins command in Stata 13. As reported in the main text, using this approach suggests that the existence of a cap reduces by about 28% the likelihood that the mean firm will exceed the federal spending floor, with 95% confidence interval from 24.18% to 32.34%. I note, though, that pooled regressions of this kind can sometimes be biased upwards.

Complete regression results are available from the author on request. I also find the expected coefficients on the control variables, as well as that increased spending is correlated with greater executive compensation. One dollar in additional grants is correlated with about ten cents in added executive salary.